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This thesis analyzes the consequences of Turkey’s natural gas cooperation with 
Iran. Two countries initiated cooperation in natural gas sales and transportation to Turkey 
and Europe. However, conflicting interests of many actors in energy issues make finding 
a solution harder. With the signing of the gas agreement between Turkey and Iran, the 
calculations became complicated even further. Turkey’s efforts to industrialize its 
economy, Iran’s struggle against the U.S. sanctions along with its ideological reputation, 
the emergence of new independent former Soviet republics that are not very independent 
economically from Russia and the U.S. objectives in enhancing the political and 
economic advance of those republics as well as containment of Iran are the major issues 
on the scene. If a compromise that would address the needs and interests of all actors in 
the region could be reached, the regional political and economic stability could have a 
substantial contribution to global security and stability. In this sense, Turkey’s natural gas 
cooperation with Iran plays an important role for future prospects, since it may distribute 
prosperity and stability through the pipelines established between two countries that can 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis deals with a specific aspect of the energy issues, which have been 
going on in the Middle East since the beginning of 1990s. In terms of coverage, it 
includes Turkey’s natural gas cooperation with Iran and its consequences regarding the 
EU, Russia and the United States. The major focus of the subject is how to achieve a 
compromise between Turkey’s interest in natural gas agreement with Iran and the 
interests of Russia and the United States in the region. Additionally, there are some 
several concerns regarding Russia, which is the sole adversary to the Iranian natural gas. 
Overall, the purpose of the thesis is to identify the consequences of Turkey-Iran natural 
gas cooperation today and in the future, predict the effects to Turkey’s relations mainly 
with the U.S., Iran, the E.U. and Russia, and to highlight the strategies that Turkey should 
follow regarding these countries. 
Why is this cooperation important? The Turkish-Iranian relations, which gained 
impetus with natural gas agreement between two countries, are opening a new period in 
such a manner that is likely to change the influence of competing powers in the region. 
The states that are subject in question are the United States and Russia. Regarding the 
Global War on Terror, Central Asia- the Middle East and European Union linkages and 
Russian desires in the region, a rapprochement between Turkey and Iran in energy field 
promotes many changes in regional dynamics. 
Although the scope of thesis focuses a period since 1990, I also examine the 
period before 1990 in Chapter 1 to understand the historical dynamics in Turkish-Iranian 
relations. Moreover, the thesis will shed light on the issues for further research projects 
for possible U.S. policy changes after November, 2004 elections in the U.S. 
In this thesis, Iranian motivations, economic and political necessities, and the 
relations of Turkey and Iran with their neighbors are crucial issues to examine on the one 
hand. Therefore, the research is based on the databases, Turkish-Iranian and international 
newspapers as sources, energy data about natural gas, and analyses about the future 
projections.  
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On the other, the question about the future of the Turkish-American relations 
emerges as a concern resulting from the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement. What are 
the implications of the U.S. reaction to the Turkish-Iranian energy cooperation? What 
kind of policies should Turkey follow to keep its U.S. ties on the best level as it had been 
during the Cold War? These questions are of great importance for Turkey regarding its 
future objectives.  
Turkey needed Iranian natural gas due to its industrial and residential needs. 
Iranian natural gas sources were large enough to supply Turkey’s gas demands. The 
initiatives of the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement started in April 1995 with the 
signing of the Memorandum of Iranian Gas Sales to Turkey as well as setting up a 
pipeline between Turkey and Iran.1 Turkey and Iran signed the natural gas agreement, 
which is worth of U.S.$20 billion, on 8 August 1996 between the contemporary Turkish 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and the Iranian Oil Minister Gholamreza Agazadeh. 
The agreement was planned to start the delivery of the natural gas to Turkey in 2001. 
Even though the signing of the agreement happened during Erbakan’s term, the issue had 
long been negotiated during previous period, the Çiller Government.2 
According to the agreement, Turkey will receive 140 billion cubic feet natural gas 
every year until 2020. Upon the signing of the agreement, Iran and Turkey agreed on the 
construction of a gas pipeline in their territories, each responsible for their part. Iran built 
a 160-mile gas pipeline until the Turkish province of Dogubeyazit, near the BTC (Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline’s merging point to Turkey.3 The natural gas transfers from Iran 
to Turkey started in December 10th, 2001. 
Currently, the U.S. follows a containment strategy in an effort to exclude Iran 
from the projects that involve energy sector. Iran became more important due to the 
Turkish-Iranian natural gas pipeline, since it complicated the calculations of the actors in 
the regional pipeline politics such as the supremacy of the Russian oil and gas pipelines 
from Central Asia to Black Sea and Europe and the U.S. supported Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan                                                  
1 Xinhua News Agency, “Iran to Sign Gas Deal With Turkey,” 8 August 1996. 
2 BOTAŞ Boru Hatları ile Petrol Taşıma A.Ş. (BOTAŞ Turkish State-Owned Pipeline Company), 
“Iran ile Doğal Gaz Alım-Satım Anlaşması (The Natural Gas Trade Agreement with Iran)”.  
http://www.Botaş.gov.tr/faliyetler/antlasmalar/iran.html. Accessed 28 April 2004. 
3 Xinhua News Agency, “Iran to Sign Gas Deal With Turkey,” 8 August 1996. 
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(BTC) pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. Especially in post-
September 11 period, Central Asia and the Caspian Basin gained a huge importance and 
the U.S. is watching Iran’s efforts to increase its influence in the region closely. 
Regarding the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement, the U.S. did not apply pressure to 
prevent the signing of the agreement despite the negative statements of some U.S. 
officials. 
The natural gas agreement with Iran offers Turkey the opportunity to establish a 
link between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States has had 
problematic relations with Iran since 1979. Turkey has an advantage to attract Iran into 
dialog with international actors and create a bridge between the United States. Having its 
indispensable relations with the United States, and economic and political advantages 
gained with the natural gas agreement with Iran, Turkey has to square addressing both 
parties’ concerns to reach a compromise. Such a compromise has political benefits 
beyond their economic benefits, such as stability and conflict resolution. Therefore, 
Turkey has to promote dialog among parties in the region, mainly with Iran due to its 
increased dialogue with the gas agreement and improve successful strategies to achieve 
interdependence. 
Furthermore, Turkey might decrease the Russian influence on Turkey in the North 
by diversifying the gas supplies through Iran. The Iranian gas deal with Turkey is not in 
Russia’s interest, since Russia is currently the major gas supplier of Turkey. Hence, 
Turkey has also to determine for some effective strategies on Russian front. 
The Turkish energy policy is mainly concentrated on assurance of energy supply, 
reliability, sufficiency and quality of the sources. Diversification of energy sources of 
Turkey gained more priority.  The energy need of Turkey is increasing dramatically and 
demands new energy options. According to some projections, the energy demand of 
Turkey in 20 years following 1998 will increase four fold, natural gas demand five fold 
until 2010, and eight fold until 2020.4 
                                                 
4 Ziya Aktaş, “Energy for Turkey and the Rest of Western World in the Next Decades,” Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, 7 May 1999. http://www.csis.org/html/sp990507Aktas.html. Accessed 
19 November 2003. 
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The dramatic increase in Turkish domestic need and Iran’s vast natural gas 
reserves bring demand and supply scenarios together. Turkey’s natural gas demand and 
the demand from Europe for diversified supplies in natural gas make Iranian alternative 
inevitable.  
In political sense, Turkey is unlikely to cease seeking a larger role in the region. 
Turkey’s geostrategic position makes it the shortest, the easiest, the most economical and 
the most stable passage between Europe, the Middle East and Caspian energy sources.  
Domestically, the crises that Turkey suffered in last decade and the instability in 
its economy required new opportunities to mitigate the situation. Iran emerges as an 
advantage for such opportunities regarding the oil and gas resources as well as potential 
commercial relations, and turns into a trump card for Turkey and the United States 
against Russia's economic dominancy in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia.  
Turkey must keep the advantages emerging from the natural gas cooperation with 
Iran in foreground and support new projections in favor of this agreement. What can be 
new prospects to strengthen the natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran? 
Regarding Turkey’s long term relations with the U.S., how could Turkey square the issue 
to overlap American and Iranian interests? To answer these questions, some findings are 
listed below: 
• Turkey’s Iran alternative may complicate the relations between the 
countries in the region including Syria, Iran, Armenia and Russia. It may 
also complicate the alliances between Russia, Iran and Armenia, and the 
U.S., Turkey and Azerbaijan. The Turkish-Iranian gas agreement may 
benefit the U.S. in achieving its objectives in Central Asia and the 
Caspian. While helping Turkey politically and economically, the gas 
agreement between Turkey and Iran can offer the Former Soviet Republics 
an outlet for the exports in oil and gas creating an alternative to Russian 
option, a U.S. interest in Central Asia and the Caspian.  
• The normalization of the U.S.-Iran relations has not been possible since 
the Islamic Revolution. Persuading Iran to adopt more reformist line in 
international arena depends on the dialogue between Iran and other states, 
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especially the EU, since Iran is not likely to interact with the U.S. in the 
short term. The economic ties between Turkey and Iran can help increase 
the interaction through improved economic ties among Iran, Turkey and 
the EU and may help Iran’s openness in the long term.  
• Because Europe desires to access the Iranian natural gas to diversify the 
gas supplies, Turkey’s increased role for the European energy corridor can 
increase Turkey’s significance for the EU and raise the prospects for 
Turkey’s full membership to the European Union. Turkey is the only 
option as transit country for Iran’s oil and gas exports to Europe. 
• Iran, having chosen the cooperation with “secular” Turkey, already 
undermined its ideological stance, because Iran has a substantial economic 
interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey. Since such attempts 
would strain the relations between two countries, Iran is not likely to risk 
the only viable option to sell its natural gas to Europe. Therefore, this 
cooperation benefits Turkey in national security sense, because Iran is not 
likely to pose a threat regarding spread of Islamic fundamentalism. 
• Turkish-Iranian natural gas pipeline may complicate Iran’s relations with 
Russia. Lack of economic options due to U.S. sanctions and pressure, Iran 
pays a special attention to maintain good relations with Russia. Currently, 
Russia is the only option for the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the 
Caspian. However, Iran offers an alternative the Russian pipelines and 
undermines the Russian monopoly through Turkish-Iranian gas pipeline. 
Therefore, Russian-Iranian relations may become more complicated, 
perceive each other as rivals and persuade Iran to seek new opportunities 
elsewhere than Russia. 
• Interdependence is the key term to explain the consequences of the 
Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement. It not only complicated the 
national calculations of the regional actors, but also tied the regional and 
global actors together directly or indirectly even though many of them had 
disputes with each other. The U.S. did not harshly oppose the Turkish-
6 
Iranian gas agreement despite the U.S. sanctions against Iran, since the 
pipelines offered Central Asia an alternative to decrease the Russian 
dominancy. Even though Iran was the stronghold of the Shi’i Islam 
ideology, it avoided an ideological approach in relations with Turkey and 
Central Asian Turkic states. The Turkish-Iranian gas agreement not only 
increased the economic and political cooperation among regional 
countries, but it also tied Iran and Central Asia to Greece and Europe. 
Greek-Iranian cooperation in natural gas created interdependence between 
Turkey, Iran and Greece, and reduced chronic political tensions. 
The question that the thesis seeks an answer is “how Turkey will deploy its 
Iranian natural gas cooperation to establish the interdependency among countries in the 
region such as Iran, Russia and New Independent States (NIS), while making the 
agreement to serve the U.S. objectives that overlap with those of Turkey. 
The sub-questions that frame this inquiry are: 
• What are the dynamics of the Turkish-Iranian relations? What were the 
controversial issues in the past, and do they still exist today? 
• What is the natural gas need of Turkey? Why does Turkey need the 
natural gas? 
• What are the advantages of natural gas deal with Iran? Is there any benefit 
that the natural gas agreement with Iran will/may deliver a contribution to 
Turkey’s future in the long term? 
• Regarding the American and Russian presence in the region, what are the 
risks or difficulties of this cooperation? What are the concerns and proper 
strategies for Turkey to overcome them?  
In order to answer these questions, Chapter II examines the past of the Turkish-
Iranian relations, stresses controversial issues, and examines Turkey’s reasons to turn to 
Iranian natural gas. Chapter III examines the advantages and the benefits that the gas 
agreement provides in favor of Turkey. Chapter IV illustrates the concerns of Iran, Russia 
7 
and the United States, which might undermine Turkey’s interest in other areas such as the 
Caspian and Central Asia. In addition to that, I shall examine the strategies that Turkey 
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II. TURKEY AND IRAN: RELATIONS IN THE HISTORY AND 
TODAY’S ENERGY COOPERATION 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to figure out the characteristics of the 
Turkish-Iranian relationship by looking at the historical facts between two countries, and 
to examine the reasons of Turkey’s preference for the Iranian natural gas.  
Figuring out the characteristics of the bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran 
is important to determine whether those criteria can be applied to today’s relations and 
thus help predicting the tendencies of both countries. Therefore, looking at the historical 
experiences between Turkey and Iran will explain the dynamics in bilateral relations 
between the two countries. 
A. THE PAST OF TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
The basic structure of the Turkish-Iranian relations can be explained by two 
important time frames: the pre-revolutionary period before February 1979, and the period 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the beginning of the 21st Century, there are some 
characteristics that go back to the history of the two countries. During the Shah’s reign, 
Turkey and Iran shared some common values and concerns that shaped the character of 
the bilateral relations between two countries. These included security perceptions, 
traditional competition between two countries and mutual recognition of each other’s 
interest.  
The first characteristic was related to territorial integrity. On the one hand, Iran 
had a large Azeri population as an internal concern and Iraq as an external threat. On the 
other, Turkey was concerned over the Kurdish population in Iraq and had Greece as a 
source of external tension in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. The second issue was related to 
the historical character of the bilateral relations. Like the Ottoman and Safavid Empires, 
Turkey and Iran perceived each other as a rival, even though they had friendly relations. 
The major indicator of competition during the period of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
was the lack of cooperation between two countries. Shah preferred to link Iran to Western 
countries, while keeping the economic and political relations with Turkey in a low 
profile. As a third characteristic, both countries recognized each other’s interest, and 
avoided any confrontation, since they were two well-balancing entities. Finally, both 
10 
countries agreed on some basic principles, such as independence from foreign forces, 
secularism, and devotion to the status quo in the region. 
 Economically, the Shah’s Iran was not a neighbor willing to cooperate with 
Turkey. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as the ultimate ruler, preferred relations with the West 
and non-neighboring countries, such as India, over neighbors, such as Turkey and 
Pakistan. Moreover, he was almost paranoid about the developments in neighboring 
countries as he displayed skepticism indicated in an interview with Mike Wallace before 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran. During that interview, the Shah expressed that “if we 
[Iran] were weak, that would be an invitation to wars”, even though Iran was a close U.S. 
ally and could easily receive help from the United States against any external threat.5 The 
competitive character of the Turkish-Iranian relations also emerged in the economic field 
and was maintained throughout the Shah’s period. Despite regional agreements, such as 
the RCD (Regional Cooperation and Development Organization), the fruitful policies 
could not be implemented in reality. 
The energy issues did not also end up with cooperation between two countries 
before the Islamic Revolution. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi basically aimed to 
cooperate with the western countries and maximize Iran’s revenues through increased oil 
prices during and after the oil crisis in 1973. Due to a desperate need for oil and gas, 
Turkey turned to the Soviets to satisfy its demand, because Iran did not have extensive oil 
and gas trade with Turkey.  
Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the relations between Turkey 
and Iran increased on political and economic levels for two reasons: the need to 
consolidate the Islamic regime and the emergence of the Iran-Iraq War. The benefits that 
Turkey’s geographic location offered to Iran prevailed over Iran’s ideological approach 
and persuaded both countries to follow a pragmatic policy to each other while ignoring 
their ideological divergences. Despite occasional political frictions, such disputes did not 
prevent either country from having good economic relations in general.  
                                                 
5 Mike Wallace, “20th Century with Mike Wallace, Crisis in Iran,” Documentary Video by History 
Channel, (New York: CBS News Productions, 2001).  
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In an economic sense, there was a significant shift in Iran from avoiding 
cooperation with Turkey in the post-Revolutionary period. The trade in goods and oil 
increased dramatically compared to the pre-revolutionary period. Despite a decline from 
the second half of 1980s until early 1990s, the economic relations proved to be more 
extensive than those in the pre-1979 period.  
In the beginning of 1990, the disintegration of the Soviet Union set new 
conditions for a new political and economic environment. The competition between 
Turkey and Iran emerged during this time regarding the vast natural oil and gas resources 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Though two countries were rivals, each trying to 
increase its influence in the newly emerging republics, both countries came to realize that 
they were bound to cooperate with each other by recognizing their own limits n being 
able to achieve their individual objectives. Turkey offered the shortest export route to 
Europe for the Central Asian and Caucasus republics, while Iran had to be taken into 
consideration to facilitate the pipeline prospects from Central Asia to Turkey. Thus, 
larger cooperation between Turkey and Iran to the agenda to benefit from the former 
Soviet republics, which would lead both countries to a natural gas pipeline agreement as I 
shall explain in Chapter III. 
1. Relations before the Islamic Revolution in Iran: “Shah’s Period” 
Turkish-Iranian relations during Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s term in the 60s 
and 70s were quite similar to their relations during his father’s period. In political terms, 
while Turkey pursued a republican constitutionalism unlike Reza Shah’s absolutist 
monarchy, both countries shared secular values, both aimed at “westernization” 
promoting the economic growth and both had “unfriendly neighbors” raising their own 
national security concerns in the region.6 Turkey and Iran’s security perceptions basically 
stemmed from the insecurity that each perceived regarding their neighbors. While 
Turkey’s security concern focused on the Greek “hostilities” in the West, Iran was trying 
to deal with Nasser’s “Arab nationalism” that was threatening the monarchies in the 
Persian Gulf. In general, even though Turkey and Iran maintained a degree of suspicion 
                                                 
6 John Calabrese, “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 1998, Vol.25, No.1, pp.75-76. 
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towards each other, they had a relatively better confidence with each other than compared 
to their other neighbors.7  
In character, the Turkish-Iranian relations had been subject to tensions and 
competition because of the heritage of their two preceding entities, the Ottoman and 
Safavid-Qajar Empires. This heritage eventually brought them into a competitive mode in 
which each sought to raise its role to one of regional leadership. When the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution took place in 1979, the trade between Turkey and Iran was almost zero and 
was an indicator for the lack of cooperation. Turkey and Iran shared the same isolation 
from the Arab world to the extent that they were two “non-Arab” countries, but this 
shared feature did not become a reason to intensify their bilateral economic relations 
between two countries. Therefore, both of them intensified their efforts to establish good 
relations with the West, especially the United States. Because both countries pursued 
separate policies with the U.S. and Europe instead of developing shared economic and 
political positions through CENTO (Cold War’s Central Treaty Alliance) or RCD 
(Regional Cooperation and Development Organization), the bilateral trade between 
Turkey and Iran was negligible.8 
However, Turkey and Iran managed to maintain a “peaceful” relationship for two 
reasons. First, Iran and Turkey recognized the “long-term balanced” nature of the 
relations between the Ottoman and Persian Empires which had created two autonomous 
entities in the geographic areas of Turkey and Iran in the past. This led Turkey and Iran to 
respect their mutual interests and maintain a level of “decent” relations. Second, the long 
tradition of power balance between the Ottomans and Persians ensured the boundaries 
between Turkey and Iran. Given the fact that the Turkish-Iranian border is one of the 
oldest borders in the world, the long history of stable border relations persuaded Turkey 
                                                 
7 Michael B.Bishku, “Turkey and Iran During the Cold War,” Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 
1999, Vol.16, No.1, p.13, and 21-22. 
8 See , “Turkey and Iran During the Cold War,” Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 1999, Vol.16, 
No.1, p.14. Also, Ünal Gündoğan, “Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological 
Influences,” MERIA-Middle East Review of International Affairs, March 2003, Vol.7, No.1. 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a1.html. Accessed 5 May 2004. 
13 
and Iran not to worry about the other’s intentions. Neither of them threatened each 
other’s security.9 
Iran was in agreement with the “main pillars” of the Turkish Republic’s basic 
foreign policy principles. First, both countries resisted territorial demands regardless of 
who claimed them (e.g. the British and the Russians). Second, Turkey opposed religious 
claims and participation in any international alliance on the basis of common religion, as 
the Shah had also pursued a secular path in Iran. Third, Turkey opposed to any irredentist 
idea referring to the Muslims living in the Soviet Union, as Iran denied any disintegration 
of its northern Azeri populated territory. Fourth, Turkey put its first priority on 
multilateral sponsorships and financial support for the international economic and 
military integration denying the superpowers’ dominance, such as the Soviet Union and 
the United States. Iran and Turkey sought to sign pacts with the regional countries, such 
as those in the RCD. Both countries tried to modernize and “Westernize” their country in 
an independent manner. Therefore, both countries’ foreign policy objectives were close 
enough to create an environment for friendly relations.10  
In the beginning of the Cold War, the political fortunes of Turkey and Iran went 
into different directions. Turkey’s and Iran’s quest in aligning with the West against a 
possible Soviet threat in the region brought a special position only to Turkey, which was 
a lot more advantageous than that of Iran. Turkey not only obtained NATO membership, 
but also received a significant amount of military aid against the communist threat 
surpassing Iran’s military capability and arousing Shah’s envy and desires for more arms 
acquisition.11  
The 1970s gave a new momentum to the Shah’s desire for arms acquisitions due 
to the Soviet-American Détente. While Turkey and Iran came closer regarding regional 
issues, such as regional sources of insecurity, Iran and Turkey had already joined to 
Pakistan to establish RCD. The aim was to increase economic and political cooperation 
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among themselves with the political support of the United States. Throughout the 1970s, 
the Shah increased his efforts further to become a regional power by acquiring massive 
arms.12 His efforts to acquire “massive arms” were not solely based on his security 
perceptions. After Russia signed treaties of friendship with India and Iraq in 1970 and 
1971, Iran perceived that as an “encirclement” by Russia and its allies and favored 
Turkey. In the mid-1970s, when the U.S. imposed arms embargo against Turkey, the 
Shah said in an interview that “the U.S. had to remove the arms embargo against Turkey, 
if they wanted to improve the security in the Middle East.”13 Even though Shah favored 
Turkey, his massive arming raised the Turkish concerns. However, Iran’s economic 
interest and the military power in the Persian Gulf eased the Turkish concerns, and 
proved that Iran was a “regional status-quo” player for Turkey.14  
2. Economic Relations During Shah’s Period: 
In economic terms, Turkey and Iran engaged each other under a regional 
cooperation organization, the RCD. Pakistani President Ayub Khan, Turkish President 
Cemal Gürsel and Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi met in Istanbul in July 1964 and 
established the RCD. According to Pakistani President Ayub Khan, “the treaty would be 
as important for them in the long run as the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
for the nations in Western Europe”. However, even though Turkey was anxious about the 
agreement’s impact on Turkey’s chance to join the EEC, such as reducing the importance 
of becoming an EU member for Turkey, it signed the treaty to increase the cooperation 
with the region countries.15   
Despite the fact that the purpose of the RCD was to achieve cooperation, 
especially in economic sphere, it did not work as anticipated. The achievements of the 
RCD from 1964 until 1979 proved to be insignificant. The economic relations between 
Turkey and Iran before RCD’s establishment were quite limited. Iran’s 0.7% of total 
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imports and 4 % of total exports to Turkey were small enough, whereas Turkey’s total 
imports from Iran were only 2.2% and exports negligible. The RCD did not change this 
picture very much. After the signing of the RCD, only nine of seventy seven authorized 
projects under RCD were realized. The trade volume between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan 
was only 2 percent of the RCD members’ total foreign trade, contrary to expectations, 
which were to increase cooperation among Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Thus, Turkey and 
Iran developed relations with each other only when it suited their particular interest.16 
This was mainly because the Shah wanted to “bypass” Turkey in his economic relations 
with the West.17 Iran aimed to develop links with the West that would benefit Iran in the 
future without involving Turkey. Many of them were based on the pipeline prospects, 
such as the agreements for $40 billion with the United States, $6 billion with France, $3 
billion with Italy and $1 billion with the United Kingdom.18 
Iran’s quest to find new partners in economic cooperation and heavy spending on 
defense neither mitigated Iran’s isolation problem, nor bolstered Iran’s independence. 
Iran sought economic partnership with India from which Iran bought cement and sugar 
and sold oil in return.  However, a combined economic operation between Turkey, 
Pakistan and Iran through the RCD was more likely to come to benefit those three 
countries regarding their proximity to each other, which would increase the coordination 
among them. Iran had the potential to improve its trade by linking itself to Europe 
through Turkey, and India through Pakistan. It could sell oil and gas to Europe, Pakistan 
and Turkey, which were desperately short of oil and gas resources. However, Iran 
preferred not to give priority to the RCD projects and thus, weakened the prospects for 
interdependence. For instance, when Turkey and Pakistan agreed to build a ball bearing 
factory in Karachi, Iran decided to build its own factory in Tabriz and tried to protect its 
production by tariffs against the Karachi production. Three developing countries could 
maximize their efforts by improving complementary economies. Nonetheless, such 
prospects failed to create cooperation between Turkey and Iran due to the Shah’s 
ambitions to become “self-sufficient” in all fields, concentrating his spending on 
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domestic industrial enterprises, but also anything else. For Turkey, being Muslim and 
“next door” did not work, because the Shah looked around for more promising partners, 
such as India. The difficulty in economic relations with India was that Iran did not have a 
direct land route to India.19 
3. Energy Relationship Between Iran And Turkey Before 1979 
In energy terms, Iran and Turkey did not have extensive cooperation, because the 
Shah usually engaged in oil and gas sales with countries that could afford the higher 
prices, such as the United States, Europe and Japan. In January 1974, when the oil 
producing countries quadrupled the oil prices as a result of the Shah’s efforts, Iran’s Shah 
saw this moment as an opportunity to convert his “rural” country into an “industrialized” 
nation and a “dominant force” in the Persian Gulf. Iran at that time pursued a pragmatic 
approach, did not join the “oil embargo” and maximized their economic benefits by oil 
sales. The Shah argued that Iran would “not mix the economics to the politics unless they 
would be directly attacked and was not interested where the oil was going once the oil 
tanker was loaded.”20  
The effects of the oil crisis in 1973-74 had a long lasting impact on keeping the 
prices high prices, and this was easily exploited by Iran. It was especially useful for Iran, 
because it was short of funds and tried to solve this problem by encouraging the increase 
of the oil prices to be able to afford Iran’s huge spending to become an industrial country. 
In an interview in 1976, the Iranian Ambassador, Ardeshir Zahedi, said that “Iran had to 
keep increasing the oil prices, since the commodities, which Iran had to import, were 
increasing in amount as well as in prices”. He also admitted that Iran was a “borrower” 
due to a large spending rate. In order to afford it, Iran would encourage the increase in the 
oil prices.21 
During the 1970s, Iran put a priority in weapon purchases seeing the Soviet 
weaponry in Iraq as a threat in the Persian Gulf. Instead of spending to further 
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petrochemical industry’s development, the Shah was more interested in having the most 
sophisticated weaponry in the region.22 Even when Iran was challenged by the U.S. 
Presidents Nixon and Ford due to future concerns of the large Iranian arms purchases, the 
Shah of Iran challenged back by stating that he “would fulfill his needs from 
elsewhere”.23 
Regionally, Turkey was also trying to industrialize its economy. However, Turkey 
was an energy importer and dependent on outside sources for oil and gas. The 
competitive character of the relations between Turkey and Iran as mentioned before 
might be one of the reasons that drove the Shah to explore other options rather than 
cooperating with Turkey. However, it is worth to note that high gas prices also hurt the 
Turkish economy preventing it from interacting economically with Iran. Competing to 
have “good” relations with the West, Iran took advantage using its gas supply. 
When European customers suffered from the increase in the oil prices in 1974, 
they directed themselves towards natural gas and created a good market for the Shah’s 
natural gas. Natural gas had never been inexpensive energy, but it became a “relatively 
cheap” source of energy compared to oil, according to the director general of Italy’s 
state-owned petroleum company, ENI’s transportation and distribution branch. Because 
the oil prices were unlikely to drop, the demand for natural gas increased dramatically 
and shifted Europe from being self-sufficient to a 15-25% gas importer in the future. The 
largest share in natural gas supplies belonged to Iran with a production of 700 billion 
cubic feet annually by 1979 in agreement with Belgium’s Bistrigaz Company. Another 
large deal involved the transfer of 450 billion cubic feet through Russian territory to 
Czechoslovakia, or it would be traded with the Soviet Union. Italy was willing to use 
Turkish territory for natural gas pipelines, yet; it failed due to lack of financing for the 
project. Thus, none of the deals between Iran and European countries were successful in 
raising the issue of natural gas transports through Turkey, but Italy left a conceptual idea 
as legacy that raised the prospects for pipelines between Iran, Turkey and Europe.24  
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Turkey played the Russian card by establishing economic links with the Soviet 
Union, especially for oil, because Turkey lacked enough commercial activities with Iran 
and the West. Between 1965 and 1975, both countries doubled their trade volume. 
Turkey signed a contract with the Soviet Union in 1978, which would provide Turkey 
three billion tons of oil in the following three years constituting the one fifth of Turkey’s 
need. The contract was signed as a barter agreement in which Turkey would pay for oil as 
wheat and metals. The signing of agreements between Turkey and the Soviet Union was 
also a result of the strained relations between Turkey and the United States following the 
arms embargo on Turkey due to Cyprus. Moreover, the RCD had already proven to be 
insufficient in its ability to provide economic and security cooperation with Iran and 
Pakistan. Turkey had to seek new alternatives to increase its security and economy 
outside of RCD and western bloc stressing, however, that “it would not effect Turkey’s 
relations with the West”.25 
In the late 1970s, Iran agreed to sell oil to Turkey following the agreements 
signed between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Increased cooperation between Turkey and 
Russia might also be regarded as a reason for the Shah’s turn towards Turkey to improve 
the relations and thus, balance the Soviet relations with Turkey. According to the 
agreement between Turkey and Iran, Turkey would purchase 1 million tons of crude oil 
and 500 thousand tons of furnace oil reimbursing the cost in agricultural products as well 
as cement and glass.26 That was Turkey’s last economic activity with the Shah’s Iran. 
Thus, the Shah’s period ended with no significant economic and political cooperation 
between two countries. Turkey’s difficulties with its balance of payments, and Iran’s 
heavy dependence on the oil revenues and desires to buy massive arms stayed intact. 
Iranian need for cash on the one hand, and Turkish need for the oil and commercial 
activities on the other continued on each side of the border of two developing 
neighboring states leaving possibilities for further economic and political cooperation to 
the future of the two countries.27 
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4. 1979 Iranian Revolution and Turkish-Iranian Relations 
Politically, Turkey’s relations with Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 can 
be examined in two steps. The first part was the period from 1979 until 1988. This period 
was concentrated mainly on two issues: the establishment and consolidation of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iran-Iraq War. The second part was the era after 1988 
until today. 1988 marked the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Even though Iran followed a 
compromising policy over its ideology during the Iran-Iraq War, the end of the war 
brought some ideological differences to the surface between Iran and Turkey and strained 
relations in the political sense.28 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 did not undermine the relations between Turkey 
and Iran during the Iran-Iraq War period, contrary, both countries had common and 
special interests in maintaining good relations following the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic. There were three factors that pushed Turkey and Iran closer. First, Turkey took 
some “judicious” steps. During Iran’s internal conflict, Turkey stayed neutral and Turkish 
officials refrained from making any statement that would either favor the Shah or the 
revolutionaries as a traditional Kemalist approach.29 After this “wait and see” policy, the 
Turkish Government immediately recognized the Iranian Regime following the 
revolution on February 14, 1979 and did not try to intervene to affect the outcome of the 
revolution. As the last judicious political step, Turkey condemned the takeover of the 
U.S. embassy by the Iranian students, but did not join the economic sanctions imposed by 
the United States, keeping in mind that Iran promised economic cooperation with Turkey. 
Turkey also opposed to the use of İncirlik Air Base by the U.S. for the hostilities against 
Iran. This decision was also effected by the U.S. arms embargo between 1974 and 1978 
against Turkey.30  
Second, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War and the neutrality of Turkey towards 
the both sides prevented any exacerbation in relations between Iran and Turkey. Iran 
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refrained from ramification to their ideology for Turkey, because Turkey did not pursue 
hostile policies towards Iran during the War. The Turkish neutrality policy also 
discouraged Iran from using the Kurdish card against Turkey as a means for instability as 
Iran had used in Iraq during the war. Throughout the war, Turkey obtained many 
economic opportunities, since Iran encouraged Turkey’s neutrality by providing 
economic opportunities as Iraq did. For Iran, Turkey was the outlet to break the isolation 
as the Iranian Foreign Minister in 1984, Ali Akbar Velayati, expressed “Iran’s happiness 
for Turkey’s neutrality” and wished “Turkey to continue it”. More to the point, Turkey 
was too valuable to risk for Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq War.31  
Third, both countries feared of possible Soviet infiltration in the region during the 
early stages of the Islamic revolution that would undermine Turkish and Iranian interests 
and stability. A communist intervention or takeover in Iran was the Turkish concern 
when huge street demonstrations and attacks against the military assets in big cities 
occurred. Therefore, Iran downplayed the ideological path over the decent relations with 
Turkey.32 
In their political bilateral relations, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran had 
some tensions, which eventually were solved by both sides. The first controversial issue 
between Turkey and Iran following the Islamic revolution became the large number of 
the Iranian refugees, which were estimated to be around 250.000 according to the New 
York Times in 1982.33 Turkey was worried about Iranian groups, which were nationalist, 
monarchist and leftist, because they opposed the Islamist regime, attracted Iran’s 
attention and turned into a matter in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran.34 
Turkey’s concerns were raised even more when the Iranian Secret Service tried to kidnap 
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a prominent member of the Iranian opposition and smuggle him back to Iran. This event 
indicated that Iranian secret service agents were operating in Turkey and working with 
Iranian groups on Turkish soil.35 As a response, Iran accused Turkey for harboring and 
supporting the anti-regime Iranian activists positioned in Turkey including, especially 
Mudjahedin Al-Khalq. Ironically, among them were also the agents of Islamic Republic 
of Iran (IRI) according to anonymous claims.36 
The second issue was the Islamic rhetoric that Iran used against Turkey’s secular 
principles. Such rhetoric raised Turkey’s concerns of Iranian support for Islamic elements 
in Turkey. When the Iranian diplomats visited Turkey in 1987, they refrained from 
visiting the mausoleum of Atatürk in Ankara. In 1988, the Iranian Embassy refused to 
lower their flag to half stall on the 50th Anniversary of the Turkish Republic’s leader’s 
death. Turkey’s perceived Islamic concern especially became clear after the Turkish 
Supreme Court’s ban of wearing the headscarf in the universities in 1989. There were 
demonstrations and protests in the streets that persuaded Turkey to believe that Iran was 
behind the Islamist groups in Turkey. Khomeini publicly expressed his critiques against 
Atatürk’s reforms defending the rule of God and the prophet over the “rule of Atatürk”. 
The Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, Manoushehr Mottaki, stated that Iran was thinking 
about economic sanctions against Turkey. Turkey responded firmly, pulled the Turkish 
Ambassador from Tehran. However, the effects of the Islamic rhetoric did not last long 
and relations returned to normal for two reasons. Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, and 
the new government led by Hashemi Rafsanjani disregarded the revolutionary rhetoric 
and put priority on the economic aspects of the bilateral relations. The Turkish 
Government also did not take the sanctions threat very seriously, because they knew that 
Iran needed Turkey as an economic outlet.37 
Third issue for friction in bilateral relations was the Turkish concerns about 
possible Iranian support for the political violence of the Marxist separatist organization, 
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PKK. PKK had intensified its activities in 1983 on the borders of Iraq. After Turkey and 
Iraq agreed to sign the “hot pursuit” agreement about allowing operations on both sides 
of the Turkish-Iraqi border, the Turkish Armed Forces conducted their first operation in 
May 1983, and Iran strongly opposed Turkish operations near Iranian border. In October 
1984, after some groups of PKK members fled to Iranian soil, Turkish delegation visited 
Iran hoping to have the same cooperation agreement as Turkey had with Iraq. Though 
Iran opposed the Turkish military operations, they signed an agreement, because Iran did 
not want to alienate Turkey regarding the Iran-Iraq War.38  
After the Gulf War, Iran had new concerns regarding the Kurds in Iraq. Unlike 
Turkey, Iran opposed the use of the Turkish bases by the American military assets for 
Operation Provide Comfort, which was to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein. For 
Iran, the United States could maintain its military presence close to the Iranian borders 
through the Operation Provide Comfort and pose a threat to Iran’s integrity regarding its 
Kurdish minority. It was also a dilemma for Turkey. Despite being uneasy with the 
presence of the foreign troops on the Turkish soil, Turkey could not take the risk of the 
refugee flow from northern Iraq.39  
Finally, the divergence between the Turkish and Iranian approaches to the Middle 
East Peace Process was a disagreement in bilateral relations starting from the early 1990s. 
Iran was weary of the improving relations between Turkey and Israel in the aftermath of 
the 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. From the Iranian 
perspective, the Turkish-Israeli military agreement that was signed in April 1996 would 
serve Zionist aims in the Middle East. Iranian executive elite claimed that Israel was 
trying to create problems between Turkey and Iran. Moreover, Turkey would let Israel 
use its territory as its backyard and Israeli specialists would be able to watch the Iranian 
border. Iranian anxiety went even further when it became evident that the economic 
cooperation could also include Azerbaijan. Iran was concerned about its territorial 
integrity regarding its Azeri population in northern Iran. Thus, Iran perceived Turkey as                                                  
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“Westoxicated” as Gharbzadegi characterized in 1960s and heavily influenced by the 
United States, given its western and secular ideology, according to Bulent Aras.40 In spite 
of all strains in mutual relations between Turkey and Iran, none of them abandoned their 
interests in their relations to receive benefits, which led both to pragmatic policies. 
5. Economic Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran: 
Economically, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Islamic Republic were 
better than the relations during the Shah’s period. Turkey’s exports to Iran increased 
dramatically from $45 million in 1978 to 1.088 million in 1983 surpassing even the trade 
volume with Germany; Turkey’s largest trade partner.41 Even though Turkey and Iran 
had divergent foreign policies and political mistrust towards each other, neither of them 
wanted to risk losing the benefits of the economic cooperation and both governments 
avoided any military confrontation. Economic gains and military security prevailed. Iran 
desperately needed its commercial activities through Turkish territory regarding the huge 
negative impacts of the economic sanctions and the Iran-Iraq War. Similarly, Turkey also 
needed the economic activities with Iran for its economic revival. As a result, Turkey 
practiced “positive neutrality” during the Iran-Iraq War, challenged the economic 
sanctions imposed against Iran by the United States and emerged as a winner of the war 
period.42  
When the unilateral sanctions were imposed on Iran by the United States in 1996, 
many countries opposed to join, such as France, Italy, Denmark and Greece, as well as 
Turkey. The U.S. Government sought support of Western European countries for the 
sanctions on Iran through meetings, and did not “push hard” to force them to participate 
the U.S. sanctions. Similarly, the U.S. Iran-Libya Sanctions (ILSA) in 1996 were 
challenged by most European countries such as France, Germany, Italy and Greece in 
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Europe. The divergence in policies against Iran displayed a parallelism with that of the 
policies in 1980s. The different approach of the European countries toward Iran is also 
likely to continue in the future. Therefore, this point also has to be taken into 
consideration by Turkish and American policymakers for future strategies.43 
Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the trade between Turkey and Iran 
decreased for two reasons. First, the widespread perception, which suggested that Turkish 
businessmen were re-exporting third-party products from Germany, and overcharging the 
Iranian customs, led to the 1985 cancellation of the barter agreements, which were signed 
in 1981 and 1982.44 The President of the Iranian Chamber of Industry, Seyyed 
Hamouchi, accused “Turkish businessmen of making excessive profits in their trade with 
Iran” and said, “we shall not tolerate this type of understanding of trade after the war”.45 
Second, 1986 brought a dramatic decline in the oil prices on the world markets, reduced 
Iran’s oil revenues from $17 billion to $7.5 billion and raised Iranian foreign exchange 
deficit.46 
6. The End of the Cold War and New Regional Dynamics: 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union heralded the end of the Cold War and the 
emergence of the “Newly Independent States” (NIS) in Central Asia resurrected the 
competitive character of the Turco-Iranian relations. “The independence of the 
predominantly Turkic, Muslim-Populated states in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
extended the boundaries of the Middle East”, as John Calabrese stated. Turkey’s location 
as a bridge to Europe and Iran’s direct access to the Persian Gulf offered new 
opportunities to all; the Central Asian republics, Turkey, and Iran.47 
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The emergence of the Caspian and Central Asian Republics was very important 
for Turkey and Iran, since they possessed potentially the largest supplies of energy 
resources. Turkey’s growing energy demand for natural gas played a significant role in it 
seeking better ties with the newly emerged republics. Turkey saw the Caspian and 
Central Asian energy sources critical to the regional energy politics. Turkey could 
become an energy corridor between Europe and Caspian resources. For Central Asia, Iran 
had a comparative advantage in access.48 
Turkey’s dependency on Iran for access Central Asia galvanized the competition 
between Iran and Turkey, which emerged from the essence of Turkey’s “secularism” 
supported by the West and Iran’s “fundamentalism”. Turkey initially was considered to 
have a better chance of acceptance by the Central Asian Republics. Almost all of them 
were Turkic-speaking. Turkey had a more dynamic economy, and had better Western 
political and economic support. However, Iran had a comparative advantage by offering 
one of two alternative routes for access to Central Asia. The other route was through 
Russia. Another alternative was not even in consideration through war-torn Afghanistan. 
Thus, Iran proved to be advantageous vis-à-vis Turkey regarding the Central Asian 
politics. Transportation from Central Asia to Turkey would remain; however, “Iran 
would be the main link” as Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian Foreign Minister stated.49  
Despite rivalry, the prospects in favor of cooperation between Turkey and Iran 
were inevitable. While Turkey and Iran competed for markets and new economic 
opportunities in Central Asia and Caucasus, both countries tried to build regional 
alliances in which the other would be absent. On the one hand, Turkey pushed forward 
for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone including Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia 
and Georgia. On the other, Iran joined the littoral states of the Caspian Sea, which does 
not include Turkey. Even though Turkey and Iran competed with each other, a 
compromise was a must regarding each other’s economic interest. Iran and Turkey 
adopted a more “cooperative” stance in the competition regarding the pipeline prospects 
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from Central Asia to Turkey that could transfer the natural gas resources of Iran and 
Central Asia to Europe. Both countries became more dependent on each other, since both 
countries would benefit from pipeline projects equally. While Iran would be able to sell 
and transfer Turkmen natural gas to Europe and receive revenues, Turkey would receive 
transit fees and contribute to its energy security. The pipelines could offer to each other a 
more advantageous position in Central Asia’s “pipeline politics” regarding the other 
players, such as Russia and the United States.50 
In general, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the NIS triggered major 
regional crisscrossing interest groups. First, Russia and Turkey, as well as the United 
States, had a common interest in limiting Iran’s ideological and economic influences. All 
of them also tried to limit Iran’s role in pipeline projects, since Iran offered an alternative 
to the Russian pipelines and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which was supported by the 
United States and Turkey. Second, Iran and Russia were concerned because of the 
cultural ties of Turkey with the Central Asian Turkic Republics, and both tried to limit 
Turkey’s influence in the region. Increased cooperation between Turkey and Central 
Asian states could also by-pass Russian and Iranian territory regarding the pipeline 
projects from Central Asia and Caucasus to West. Finally, Iran and Turkey were 
concerned with the Russian moves designed to limit Turkey and Iran’s influences. Russia 
had an enduring legacy in Turkic republics after ruling many years. Besides, Russian oil 
and gas pipelines were the only present structure for the Central Asian exports. Russia’s 
pipeline structure also could weaken the role of Turkey and Iran. Thus, three different 
interests that overlapped with each other complicated the politics in the region.51 
Another reason that complicated the regional politics was the crisis between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan about the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Two significant factors 
prepared the conditions for two de facto alliances between the U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan 
and Russia-Iran and Armenia. First, the “nationalist” statements of Azeri officials related 
to “greater Azerbaijan” regarding the 20 million Azeri populations in the Iranian territory                                                  
50 Henri J.Barkey, “Iran and Turkey: Confrontation Across and Ideological Divide,” Regional Power 
Rivalries in the New Eurasia, (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1995) Ed. Alvin Z.Rubinstein and Oles 
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Rivalries in the New Eurasia, (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1995) Ed. Alvin Z.Rubinstein and Oles 
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raised the national security concerns of Iran, which pushed Iran closer to Armenia. 
Second, the Haydar Aliyev Government sided with the United States and accepted the 
U.S. proposal to exclude Iran from the Caspian Oil Project. According to the project, 
Azerbaijan would transfer its oil through pipelines to Georgia and then to a Turkish 
Mediterranean port, Yumurtalık. The prospects even included a “trans-Caspian” natural 
gas pipeline that would by-pass Iran and Russia using the sub-sea pipeline in the Caspian 
Sea. Thus, Iran and Russia sided with Armenia to respond to the American-Turkish and 
Azeri cooperation throughout 1990s.52 
7. Continuity or Change: The Historical Dynamics That Prevailed 
Today, Turkey and Iran still have some characteristics that survived from the pre-
revolutionary period to post-Revolutionary Iran, which should be taken into consideration 
in the future. The security perceptions of two countries stayed parallel in many instances, 
which pushed each other closer to cooperate. When looking at today’s relations, this 
specific characteristic is still intact in bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran. On the 
one hand, “Turkey’s external security concern”, the tensions between Greece and Turkey, 
eased and both are practicing good relations. Therefore, Turkey’s external threat 
perceptions regarding Greece are not the same as before. However, Turkey’s perceived 
threat to its territorial integrity can be argued in context of ongoing process in Iraq. 
Turkey has had a security concern regarding the Kurdish population in northern Iraq 
before and after the OIF. 
On the other hand, Iran is having political and economic difficulties because of 
the U.S. economic sanctions and political pressure due to Iranian WMD and terrorism 
support allegations, which raised Iran’s external threat perceptions. Moreover, the 
Kurdish population in northern Iraq contributes to Iran’s security perceptions regarding 
their own territorial unity. Therefore, Turkey and Iran have enough overlapping interest 
regarding Iraq, the Kurdish population in particular, which pushes them closer to each 
other. 
The competitive character of the bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran was 
another characteristic that prevailed in the post-Cold War environment. It gained an 
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impetus especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The emergence of the 
new, mostly Turkic-speaking republics in Central Asia and Caucasus triggered a new era 
of competition between Turkey and Iran for influence and economic gains in those 
regions. Therefore, the long tradition of competition for influence in the history of two 
countries is likely to continue in future relations. 
 Mutual recognition of each other’s interest is the third feature that continued in 
the relations between Turkey and Iran. Today, Turkey and Iran still keep their relations 
“decent” and avoid any radical confrontation with each other as an important attribute for 
the stability between two countries. Besides, Turkey’s linkage to Europe and the 
Mediterranean, and Iran’s linkage from Turkey to Turkmenistan as well as other Central 
Asian Republics beyond, persuaded both to recognize the fact that they are bound to 
cooperate with each other in order to maximize their own benefits. For that reason, the 
peaceful character in Turkish-Iranian relations is likely to continue in the future and must 
be taken into account for constructive prospects in the region, such as conflict resolution 
and security building initiatives. If Turkey and Iran agree on an initiative, the other 
countries in the Caspian and Central Asia are likely to follow, since both are the outlet 
routes for the regional countries to the world markets.  
Finally, Turkey and Iran are strongly committed to the status quo in the region as 
both of them proved to be firm in their positions in the 20th century. Neither of them 
attempted to destabilize any other country in the region including each other, a must for 
the region’s stability in the future. Regarding the two countries’ geographic positions, it 
is very crucial to have Turkey and Iran’s support to initiate economic and political 
developments in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Today, Turkey and Iran are sitting in the middle of the most crucial geographic 
areas, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Caucasus and Central Asia 
have the potential to bring stability and new energy to the world markets. The moderate 
view towards Islam in all of the Central Asian republics promises more than any other 
region to prove Islam’s compatibility with democracy, which would have tremendous 
implications for the rest of the Muslim World, a strategic goal of the United States. 
Moreover, the United States needs those areas for an effective “Global War on 
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Terrorism” in regards to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) as the 
major U.S. security concern in Iraq and Afghanistan; the increasing linkages between the 
EU, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East as well as the U.S. and Russian 
presence as struggling major forces in Central Asia, all make Turkey and Iran 
indispensable to achieve the objectives.  
Turkey and Iran are integral to achieving these goals, since they are the route, the 
linkage and the buffer for many possible strategies in the region. They are the route, since 
both offer an outlet for the Caspian and Central Asia to the Mediterranean and the Persian 
Gulf. They are the linkage, since the U.S. must go through one of those countries, if it 
wants to access the Central Asia and the Caspian. They are buffer, because Turkey and 
Iran keep the Russia outside of the Middle East. Therefore, the cooperation between 
Turkey and Iran increasing the interdependence is in the interest of the United States and 
the Western world to soften Iran’s radical approach, promote openness in Iran, and 
promote Turkey’s development as a model of Muslim and democratic country. The 
Turkish-Iranian natural gas cooperation creates a start point to raise the prospects for 
interdependence and cooperation in the region. Even though two countries do not follow 
the same path in their ideologies, their interdependence has the potential to increase the 
cooperation among the regional countries for regional stability and economic progress in 
order to protect their national interest. In this context, the Turkish-Iranian natural gas 
pipeline is the vital element to promote good relations between Iran and the West. 
B. THE BACKGROUND OF TURKEY’S NATURAL GAS AGREEMENT 
WITH IRAN 
1. Turkey’s Preference for the Iranian Natural Gas 
Given the past relations and characteristics in bilateral relations between Turkey 
and Iran, the incentives for cooperation about natural gas should be made clear to 
understand the changing character of the relations between Turkey and Iran.  
Turkey has various policy priorities regarding energy issues, and they are: 
Satisfying the domestic energy demand, diversification of the supplies and decreasing the 
dependency on a single source, prospects for being an energy hub, and finding solutions 
for environmental concerns. 
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The Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement is a result of various reasons that are 
included in the Turkish energy policy priorities previously mentioned. Therefore first, the 
Turkish energy policy in the beginning of the new millennium will be explained 
following a brief economic history. Then, the reasons for increased gas usage on a global 
scale will be covered as well as the Turkey’s preference for Iranian natural gas. Finally, 
Turkey’s suppliers and other related issues to the suppliers, which lead Turkey and Iran 
to the natural gas agreement, will be examined. 
2. General Look at the Turkish Economy: 
A general look at the Turkish economy is crucial in order to identify the economic 
preconditions for Turkey’s motivation towards the natural gas cooperation with Iran. 
Turkey’s de facto goal has been the achievement of the full membership to the European 
Union. Therefore, economic progress became a major subgoal. Natural gas cooperation 
with Iran not only offers a new energy source, but also creates new commercial 
opportunities such as increased trade activities with Iran to achieve this subgoal.   
Although some 42% of the economically active population is concentrated in the 
agriculture sector, Turkey’s industry and tourism are the fastest growing sectors of the 
Turkish economy. In human terms, Turkey is one of the 20 most populous countries in 
the world and has the fastest growth rate of all OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) countries. 53 With a current population of 67 million, it is 
estimated that Turkey will reach a population of 80 million by 2015. 
Turkey suffered from the economic crisis in 1990s. There are three main causes 
for Turkey’s economic struggle, i.e. political instability, earthquakes and untaxed 
underground economy. First, because Turkey’s internal market has been very sensitive to 
political changes due to a large government role in the finances of local markets, the 
political instability became a major cause for decline in the economy throughout 1990s. 
54 
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Second, an earthquake set another stage for the decline of Turkey’s economy. The 
devastating earthquake of 1999 severely disrupted the economic activities in Istanbul 
region, the heartland of industry. 55 Despite the efforts of the Turkish government’s 
extensive economic programs to overcome chronic high inflation, the earthquakes of 
August 1999 and financial crisis in 2001 brought nearly a 10% reduction in the 
economy.56  
Third, some other factors also contributed to the economic failure. A large 
untaxed underground economy, sharp income inequalities, low levels of private 
investment, large inefficient state sector and highly bureaucratized legal and 
administrative procedures were all the other issues. 57 Thus, Turkey’s economic struggle 
created the preconditions for Turkey’s drive towards the Iranian natural gas as a means to 
economic achievement. 
3. Turkish Energy Policy: 
Turkish energy policy has multiple objectives. The geographic location of Turkey 
makes such a multidimensional policy inevitable. On the one hand, Turkey’s proximity to 
Russia, the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and the Middle East facilitates Turkey’s ability 
to reach the energy rich areas. On the other hand, ‘energy hungry’ Europe is at the other 
edge on the western borders of Turkey and raises the prospects for becoming an energy 
hub in the region. Therefore, Turkish energy policy can be defined as a result of the gap 
between internal demand and supply capacity, the need of diversified and reliable cost-
effective sources, the pipeline prospects that are focused on the North, East and the 
Southeast of Turkey, and finally the environmental concerns.58   
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4. Iranian Natural Gas Agreement in Turkish Energy Policy: 
The Iranian natural gas agreement fits well in Turkish energy policy priorities. As 
the first priority, closing the gap between energy demand and supply ultimately dictates a 
policy in favor of Iranian gas purchase. As the electricity demand started to soar due to 
improvement of Turkey’s living standard, natural gas became a major concern in future 
prospects, which will be explained later.59  
The second priority is the energy security of Turkey. The diversification of the 
supplies is possible since Turkey has either borders or an advantageous geographic 
proximity to the energy rich areas in Russia, the Caspian Basin, the Central Asia and the 
Middle East. In natural gas, Russia is the largest producer among Turkey’s natural gas 
suppliers (61% in 2003).60 However, the disputes over the feasibility of the Blue Stream 
pipeline under Black Sea from Russia to Turkey and the excessive dependency on 
Russian natural gas created a controversy in favor of diversification. Iranian natural gas is 
the closest diversifying alternative to mitigate regarding these concerns.61  
Third aspiration of the Turkish energy policy is “to become an energy bridge from 
the East to West, and the North to South”, as Haldun Danışman, Deputy Under-Secretary 
at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, stated at the Power Projects 2000 
Conference in Istanbul in June 1998.62 The oil pipeline projects from the Caspian, 
Central Asian and the Middle Eastern energy resources to the western markets created the 
“new great game”, replacing the railroads with pipelines to assert political influence. 
Turkey stands at the cross point of such pipeline projects. Choosing the Iranian option in 
natural gas and having a pipeline between two countries is another step towards 
becoming an energy bridge between Europe and the Middle East as Turkey envisions 
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itself. Iranian gas is not only likely to satisfy Turkey’s internal gas demand, but also 
reimburse itself through the transit fees it could charge others.63 
As the last reason, environmental concerns also emerge as one of the strong 
motivations to encourage Turkey to seek natural gas usage, because gas is less polluting 
than coal, lignite or oil. The air quality became a big concern especially in urban areas 
due to extensive usage of wood in households. In addition, coal and oil operated 
electricity generation plants also contributed to the atmospheric pollution as the 
electricity consumption increased. Therefore, natural gas import is recommended, 
because it can help decrease the pollution level, which leads the policymakers to consider 
the Iranian natural gas.64 
5. Why is Gas the Favorite? Why Does Turkey Prefer It? 
When looked in general, there are some certain factors that encourage natural gas 
usage. The trend around the world is in favor of gas for power production vis-à-vis other 
materials. According to the Energy Information Administration’s 2003 International 
Energy Outlook, natural gas is expected to be the fastest growing component of the world 
primary energy consumption. In 2025, the natural gas consumption is expected to be 
nearly double (176 Tcf) of what it was in 2000 (See Figure 1).  
Natural gas usage increased especially in the last decade. Turkey’s purchase of 
natural gas began in 1987 with imports from the former USSR. The initial volume 
increased due to fast economic growth, industrialization, population and rapid 
urbanization. The general power generation using gas in Turkey in 1990s increased 300% 
as a result of growing residential and industrial consumption with an increase of 460%.65  
Turkey had three reasons to prefer natural gas. First, electricity demand is 
increasing as the standard of living improves. Second, environmental gas has always been 
readily available from neighbors, such as Russia and Iran. Third, Turkey has energy hub 
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plans, because it has both neighbors with vast natural gas resources and outlets for the 

































Natural Gas Consumption Projections for 2025
Figure 1.   Consumption and Projections Around the World 67 (Trillion Cubic Feet) 
The first reason for the trend is electricity. Electricity is a major component of 
daily and industrial activities, and natural gas is directly related to the electricity 
generation sector. The abundance of natural gas reserves, technological flexibility and 
feasibility of gas using power plants, and the ambiguity in nuclear power prospects, such 
as feasibility and safety concerns, are major reasons to prefer gas in power generation. In 
2000, 7% (14 GW) of global electricity generating capacity came from gas, while nuclear 
capacity achieved only 2.15% (4.3 GW) (See Figure 2).68 
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Figure 2.   Share of Natural Gas in Power Production 
Environmental concerns are the second reason to prefer gas. The high efficiency 
of gas and the concerns about weather pollution favor increased gas usage. The World 
Energy Outlook 2002 estimated the annual gas usage in power generation would grow by 













Figure 3.   Energy Usage Growth in Power Generation 
As the third reason, Turkey’s potential to become an energy hub in the region 
facilitates becoming a bridge that links Europe and the Middle East and Central Asia. 
Turkey is surrounded by the rich energy sources of the Caspian and the Middle East in 
the East. On the other side, Europe is largely dependent on the Russian supply and in 
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pursuit of an alternative to diversify its supply as it will be mentioned in benefits of the 















Figure 4.   Natural Gas Consumption Projections in Turkey (Billion Cubic Feet)70 
 
6. Turkey’s Gas Suppliers: 
Turkey has various suppliers. Turkey imports natural gas from Russia and Iran, 
and LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) from Algeria and Nigeria. Currently, Russia provides 
the largest portion among Turkey’s natural gas supplies. Algeria and Nigeria are 
supplying Turkey with LNG because a pipeline is not possible between Turkey and those 
countries. However, it requires more time and effort to reprocess the LNG back to 
normal. Therefore, natural gas that is transported through pipelines is available only from 
Russia and Iran. 
According to the contracts signed so far, Russian Federation will continue to hold 
its dominant position in Turkey’s natural gas imports. However, it might be possible to 
decrease the dependency on Russian gas by using Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan 
supplies, two of which are planned to start by 2005 (See Figure 6).71 
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Figure 6.   Turkey’s Natural Gas Contracts with Countries* (Billion Cubic Feet/Year)72 
* Amounts in agreements signed so far 
 
7. Why Should Turkey Buy Natural Gas From Iran? 
There are several reasons to explain why Turkey should buy natural gas from 
Iran. Russia’s largest portion in Turkey’s gas supplies and the potential technical 
difficulties of Russia’s Blue Stream pipeline are one side of the equation. The other is 
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Turkey’s projected gas demands in the future and Iran’s potential in its proven gas 
reserves to satisfy the demands. Both reasons make Iranian gas an attractive option. 
As one side of the concern, the large portion of Russian gas among Turkey’s 
suppliers brings the question of a possible risk of energy crisis, since Turkey is largely 
dependent on the Russian supply. The dependency on the Blue Stream pipeline is the first 
reason to criticize the Russian supply, which directs Turkey to Iranian natural gas as a 
need for diversification of supplies. Russia’s current share in Turkey’s natural gas supply 
is 61% and half of it is being provided through Blue Stream pipeline under Black Sea. If 
Turkmen and Azeri gas projects start as planned, Russia’s share will decrease to 50% in 
the beginning of 2006. Russia’s share does not change in 2010, and there is 5% share 
















































































































Figure 7.   Turkey’s Natural Gas Suppliers in 2006, 2010 and 2015 (No significant change in 
2020)73 
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The Blue Stream pipeline in particular is the focus of the critiques, because it 
largely contributes to the dependency transporting the half of Russian supply to Turkey. 
The Blue Stream pipeline is the deepest and longest sub-sea pipeline in the world. When 
considering that the bottom of the Black Sea is covered with slimy, sulfur-rich ooze 
corrosive to ordinary pipelines, then the feasibility and maintainability of the Blue Stream 
becomes an issue, especially because Blue Stream provides half of the Russian natural 
gas to Turkey. If mud volcanoes, methane seepages, slope failures and earthquakes are 
included among other factors, it is obvious that Turkey could face energy cutoffs for a 
long period of time as a result of natural incidents. Thus, possible energy cutoffs turn into 
a potential threat to Turkey’s energy security as a result of Blue Stream’s high potential 
risks.74 
The other side of the concern as to why Turkey should import gas from Iran is 
that Turkey’s projected natural gas demand requires more gas imports. When comparing 
the future demand projections by BOTAS (the Turkish Pipeline Company) to the 
contracts already signed, Turkey is likely to have a surplus until 2010. However, there 
will be a significant increase in natural gas demands after 2010. Therefore, Turkey either 
has to sign new contracts, or increase the amounts in current contracts, both of which lead 
Turkey to the Iranian natural gas as the first optimum choice (See Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.   Turkey’s Natural Gas Contracts with Countries (Billion Cubic Feet/Year)75 and 
Projected Natural Gas Demands76 
If Turkey needs more natural gas, Iran offers a reasonable option due to several 
reasons. First, Iran has vast natural gas reserves and possesses half as much as Russia’s 
and four times that of Saudi Arabia’s estimated natural gas reserves according to 
Oil&Gas Journal’s estimates. Moreover, Iran has a ready-to-use pipeline infrastructure 
that facilitates the cooperation. Therefore, Iran has the potential to react to demands very 
quickly.77 
Second, Iran is a neighbor of Turkey.  Therefore, there will be no transit fees on 
the final price of the gas in Turkey due to the absence of a transit country. As another 
advantage, Iran is a direct provider to Turkey. Therefore, there is no obligation for 
Turkey and Iran to deal with a third party regarding the pipeline security. Other suppliers 
in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, would have to build 
pipelines through either Iraq or Syria. However regarding Turkey’s energy hub plans, a 
single country may be able to use the pipeline as a card against Turkey and the supplier, 
or Turkey and the supplier could be affected by the instability of the transit country.  
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Third, Iran is more committed to natural gas cooperation with Turkey compared 
to other Middle Eastern countries because of two reasons: The ILSA (Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act), which leaves little room for Iran in pipeline politics, and the absence of 
another viable route for pipelines to Europe. All these factors make Iran more committed 
to the cooperation with Turkey and a feasible alternative for Turkey’s future goals. 
All reasons given before create the preconditions for Turkey’s motivations to seek 
natural gas imports from Iran. Dependent largely on the Russian supplies in natural gas, 
Turkey’s energy policies as well as global tendencies direct Turkey to a very close 
supply. Iran’s pragmatic policy incentives also facilitate close relations between Turkey 
and Iran as it will be explained in next chapter. Thus, the Turkish-Iranian natural gas 





III. THE BENEFITS OF TURKEY-IRAN NATURAL GAS 
COOPERATION FOR TURKEY: INTERDEPENDENCE FOR 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The realization of benefits from the Turkish-Iranian natural gas cooperation is 
increasingly vital for ensuring the success of Turkey’s future goals. If Turkey can achieve 
some of its economic, political and security objectives through the natural gas 
cooperation with Iran, it may increase Turkey’s chance for further progress in political 
and economic issues. 
Even though the primary focus of this chapter covers Turkey, Iran, Russia and the 
United States as major players, the European Union is also reviewed as a factor for the 
motivation of the Turkish energy politics. Natural gas is the key to my argument, because 
it is the natural gas cooperation with Iran that will contribute Europe’s energy security 
through Turkey and increase the significance of Turkey for Europe. 
Turkey has various policy priorities regarding energy issues, and they are: 
Satisfying the domestic energy demand, diversifying supplies and decreasing dependency 
on a single source, becoming an energy hub, and finding solutions for environmental 
concerns. 
The benefits of Turkey-Iranian natural gas cooperation are examined on three 
different levels: political/security, economic and environmental. All levels address a 
different aspect of Turkey’s motivation for importing gas from Iran, such as increasing 
Turkey’s security through cooperation, becoming energy hub and highlighting the 
significance for Europe, increasing the commercial activities with Iran, and help Iran’s 
political openness. 
The Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement is a result of various reasons that are 
included in the Turkish energy policy priorities previously mentioned. Therefore first, the 
Turkish energy policy in the beginning of the new millennium will be explained 
following a brief economic history. Then, I will cover the reasons for gas usage on a 
global scale as well as Turkey’s reasons to prefer natural gas, Turkey’s suppliers and 
44 
related issues to the suppliers. Finally, I will examine the benefits of Turkish-Iranian gas 
agreement. 
B. TURKEY’S BENEFITS FROM THE NATURAL GAS COOPERATION 
WITH IRAN 
1. Benefits for Iran 
Turkey’s natural gas cooperation with Iran has numerous economic and political 
advantages for the Iranian regime and the country that could persuade them to value this 
cooperation. Iranian route is argued to be the “most viable” route among the possible 
pipelines in the region, according to a cost-benefit analysis in Oil&Gas Journal.78 
Economic benefits for Iran from gas pipelines to Turkey are multidimensional. First, Iran 
obtains vast revenues from gas sales to Turkey that would help revive the Iranian 
economy. This revenue is likely to increase in the future upon the completion of the gas 
pipeline between Greece and Turkey, which would connect Iran to the European market.  
Second, the cooperation between Turkey and Iran is not limited to energy 
cooperation. Turkey and Iran agreed to increase cooperation in commercial activities 
regarding the health, environment, telecommunication as well as transportation and 
custom issues. In parallel to that, both countries established border trade centers to 
monitor and improve the trade activities during the 17th term meeting of Turkey-Iranian 
Joint Economic Commission (JEC) held in Ankara in April 2003. While nearly 40 Iranian 
businessmen arrived in Istanbul to meet their Turkish counterparts, Iranian Vice 
President, Mohammad Reza Aref, said that “all sectors in two countries could make 
economic cooperation with joint investment” by stating “only natural gas should not be 
considered in improvement of relations”.79  
Third, Iran increased its importance to Central Asian states in pipeline politics, 
especially with Turkmenistan. Since Iran and Turkmenistan are border neighbors and 
Turkmenistan is dependent on the Russian pipelines in oil and gas exports, Iranian route 
offers the other viable route. Iran also offers another advantage, the existing pipeline 
structure in the country. For that reason, the construction of a gas pipeline from 
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Turkmenistan to Iran started at the end of 1996 with the presence of Turkish, Iranian and 
Turkmen Presidents, and was completed by the end of next year, December 1997.80 
Iranian gas agreement with Turkey also provides some political benefits. First, 
Iran will eventually receive a support for its political stability. Because Turkey and 
Europe will watch Iran’s stability closely in regards to their energy security, Iran is likely 
to enjoy this political support. As Selahattin Alpar, the Turkish Ambassador to Tehran in 
2001, stated; “the gas project between the two countries, apart from its economic 
benefits, illustrates the strategic and political considerations that both Tehran and Ankara 
have made their priorities.”81 
Second, Iran is likely to benefit politically and economically from increased 
Greek-Iranian relations as a result of the natural gas pipeline to Turkey. Turkey-Iran 
natural gas pipeline is of great importance between Greece and Iran. Iran will be able to 
transfer natural gas to Greece through Turkey. To implement this project, Turkish-Iranian 
natural gas pipeline will be extended to Greece. During the second half of his European 
tour to Europe in March 2002, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami held talks with his 
Greek counterpart, and two countries agreed to cooperate with each other in the field of 
gas, customs, investments and commodities tariff. Iran is improving its relations with 
Greece, the most Eastern member of the European Union as a result of improved 
cooperation between two countries. Thus, Iran might have a greater voice in the EU 
regarding its relations with the EU and Greece in particular.82 
Third, Iran’s improved relations with Greece are not only a bilateral 
improvement. Through bilateral talks, Iran is increasing the interdependence between 
Iran, Turkey as well as Greece. The interdependence between three countries may lead to 
increased commercial and political interaction among them, which would benefit Iran the 
most, regarding the economic sanctions and political pressure of the United States. 
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Therefore, Iran is obtaining political and economic advantages vis-à-vis its perceived 
American concern in the region by improving its proximity to the EU. 83 
Fourth, Iran’s natural gas cooperation is a win-win investment for Iran and the EU 
in political sense. Through contributing to the European energy security, Iran obtains 
political support for its regime. However, Iran also is bound to soften its ideological 
hardliner approach to guarantee this political support in the future, which might 
undermine the power of the hard-liners in the long term.  
2. The EU Membership 
The natural gas agreement has an important effect (or consequence) regarding 
Turkey’s EU membership process: the interdependence between the EU, Turkey and 
Iran, which would help Turkey’s interest to become an EU member. The natural gas need 
of Europe, Turkey’s position as a linkage between the EU and the Middle East, and vast 
Iranian natural gas supplies are the elements of the interdependence context among three. 
When regarding the contribution that the Iranian natural gas could do for Europe’s energy 
security, it is clear that Europe can achieve diversification of its natural gas supplies.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) forecasts that Iran will become 
the major gas supplier of the European Union.84 This assessment is true for three 
reasons. First, Russian natural gas is considered important “in greatest extend” and 
inevitable as this view was expressed in the European Commission’s green paper, 
“Toward a European Strategy of Energy Supply”. 85 However, it increases the 
dependency of Europe on a single gas supply and puts Europe on a risk. Russia delivers 
gas to Western Europe through the Ukrainian territory. When Russia dramatically cut the 
gas deliveries to Ukraine at the end of 1992, supply of Russian gas to Germany was 
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halved as a result of Ukraine’s usage of the Russian exports to Germany. Therefore, the 
EU has to diversify its natural gas supply to ensure European energy security.86 
Second, Turkey’s political stability and commitment to the EU facilitates the 
prospects that Turkey can be a “secure link” for Europe’s energy security providing the 
oil and natural gas of the Middle East, the Caspian and even Central Asia. 
Third, Iran possesses vast amount of proven gas reserves and has a strong interest 
in getting revenues derived from oil and gas for its economy, especially due to the U.S. 
economic sanctions. The U.S. sanctions increase the importance of the European market 
for Iran and pushes Iran closer to Europe. 
Since Turkey is Iran’s shortest link to Europe, the Turco-Iranian gas pipeline will 
eventually become one of the reasons to justify Turkey’s full EU membership. Turkey’s 
membership to the EU would contribute to Turkey’s political and economic stability 
immensely. If Turkey becomes a part of the EU, Europe can ensure its energy supplies in 
the Middle East, the Caspian and Central Asia, because the EU would be the “neighbor” 
to those areas. 
Turkey’s E.U. membership has been a primary objective of Turkish Foreign 
Policy. The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession at the Helsinki European 
Council in 1999 introduced a new era in the Turkish-European relations.87 In 2000, the 
E.U. approved an Accession Partnership Agreement, which included preparations that 
Turkey must implement before becoming an E.U. member country. Since then, many 
reforms have been undertaken by Turkey such as the Electricity Market Law in 2001, 
which would liberalize the energy sector and increase the number of entrepreneurs to 
help reduce electricity cuts.88 In October 2002, the E.U. indicated that Turkey still 
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needed further reforms to become a full member. The E.U. will decide whether to start 
membership talks with Turkey at the end of 2004.89 
Europe’s long term strategic issue in energy is how best to satisfy the demand and 
ensure a secure supply. It sees Russia as an inevitable source due to the vast Russian gas 
production capabilities. By 2020, almost 70% of Europe’s gas demand will be imported, 
and up to 40% of that amount will come from Russia increasing the dependence on 
Russia.90 
However, Russian gas supply will not suffice in the event of a political crisis. The 
need for diversification of supply is still important as a general strategy. Besides, Russia 
has to develop its energy sector, which will take a long time and require huge 
investments. Therefore, considering that the European continent is within the reach of the 
Caspian Basin and the Middle East resources might generate an alternative, if Europe can 
benefit from Turkey’s key position in diversifying gas supplies.91 
Having proven reserves surpassed only by Russia, Iran’s desire to export its 
natural gas is not a surprise. Iran has India as an option in the East to export its natural 
gas through Pakistan and Europe in the West through Turkey. The latter overlaps 
Turkey’s ambitions to become an energy hub, achieve economic development, and 
contribute to its integrity to the West and thereby achieving EU membership. Therefore, 
the demand and supply projections of Europe are important to understand in evaluating 
whether Iran has the capacity to supply Europe.  
Iran offers a comparable supply capacity, half alone of that of Russia, for the 
EU’s natural gas demand to achieve energy security in the long term. It is projected that 
Europe is likely to face an increased dependency on imported gas from 40% to more than 
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60% by 2015 mainly on Russia, according to Wood Mackenzie.92 European suppliers are 
not likely to provide enough indigenously produced gas based on the numbers of proven 
reserve estimates. Norway is Europe’s largest supplier and has a gas reserve estimate of 
less than 10% of that of Iran. Europe’s three largest suppliers’, Norway, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom, total reserve amount is only 20% compared to that of Iran 
according to EIA’s last estimated proven reserves. These facts suggest that Iran has the 
capacity to supply the E.U. in natural gas (See Figure 9).93  
If the yearly consumptions of five top EU countries are compared to total proven 
reserves of first ten biggest gas supplier countries in Europe, the natural gas reserves in 
Europe will be depleted in 15 years, if Europe does not import gas. Any sudden increase 
in the European consumption may even shorten the term. Therefore, Iran’s contribution 
to Europe’s energy security can be tremendous. More to the point, this is only achievable 
by transportation through Turkey. In turn, this would enhance Turkey’s geopolitical 
significance to the EU and such as gas agreement would further Turkey’s political 
objectives (See the yearly consumption of the European countries in Figure 10). 
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Figure 10.   Top 5 European Countries in Consumption (Bcf)95 
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3. Becoming Energy Hub 
It is not a new idea on this page. I mentioned this point in Turkish energy policy 
priorities on page 35 (under Turkish energy policy priorities)-36 (Haldun Danışman’s 
statement- footnote 62) 
Even though Turkey, Russia and Iran compete for the pipeline projects in the 
Caucasus and the Middle East in order to receive transit fees, three major projects 
eventually pass through the Turkish territory. First, Russian oil has to be shipped either 
through Bosporus or through the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline, while the Blue 
Stream natural gas pipeline comes directly from Russia under the Black Sea providing 
the half of the Russian gas supplies to Turkey. Second, the BTC pipeline starts from 
Azerbaijan, goes through Georgia and passes through Turkish territory ending at the 
Turkish Mediterranean port Ceyhan. Third, Turkish-Iranian natural gas pipeline is used to 
ship the Iranian natural gas to Turkey and beyond. Regarding all these projects in the 
region, Turkey’s geostrategic location facilitates becoming an energy hub on the route 
from the Middle East and the Caspian to Europe. Turkey is a natural passage for the 
energy transfers, because Turkey sits in the middle of the vast oil and natural gas rich 
areas on one side and European markets on the other.  
Becoming an energy terminal has two benefits for Turkey: first, it can contribute 
to Turkey’s security and stability; second, the interdependence between Turkey and Iran 
may lead to cooperation in different areas.  
Many European consumer countries’ interest in securing the gas supply will 
converge on Turkish territory and thus, enhance Turkey’s political and security stability. 
If Turkey can contribute to Europe’s energy security, then Turkey is likely to receive 
more support for its security and stability than before.  
Turkish officials articulated the energy hub prospect of Turkey several times. 
Following the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (See 
Footnote 62), Haldun Danisman’s statement in 1998, then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem 
in 1999 declared Turkey’s aim as “a pivotal member of Eurasia”. He pointed to the 
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construction of the energy pipelines across the Turkish territory as demonstrating this 
goal.96 
The former U.S. National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski suggests that Turkey can become a geostrategic player and become 
more influential in the region, especially in Caucasus. According to him, Turkey can play 
such a strategic role as it develops infrastructural and energy capabilities. If other factors, 
such as physical size, large population and economic potential, are taken into 
consideration, Turkey should be able to manage becoming an energy terminal among 
those three significant areas, Europe, the Caspian and the Middle East.97 
Turkey is on the way to becoming a hub for energy distribution for the developed 
world, especially the EU. The natural gas pipeline from Iran, an ongoing oil pipeline 
from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port Ceyhan, and another gas pipeline project 
through Turkey to Greece and beyond are various connections between the abundant 
reserves of the Caspian and the Middle East, and major ports of the Western 
Mediterranean and Europe itself. No country stands to benefit from the increased number 
of the pipelines in the region more than Turkey, and the Iranian natural gas deal with 
Turkey is a significant step to such benefits.98 
As for interdependence, increased trade activities are likely to follow Turkey-Iran 
natural gas cooperation. This creates a larger mutual reliance within the broader region in 
economic and political terms. Such mutual cooperation may create preconditions for 
increased cooperation at the state and regime level, with the Central Asian states in 
particular. This prospect is especially important for United States objectives, which 
stipulate the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, democratization and 
economic prosperity for social stability of the Central Asian states. These objectives are 
especially important to promote the moderate view of Islam in Central Asian Muslim 
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societies and limit the Russian and Chinese interests that threaten the sovereignty and 
independence of the Central Asian states.99 
The context between Turkey and Iran is an “interdependence”, since Turkey 
needs Iranian cooperation for its natural gas, and Iran needs Turkey for the natural gas 
pipelines to Europe as well as Turkey’s political assistance in international relations. As a 
Washington attorney that serves on the board of a Russian petrochemical company 
argues, “Pipelines, […] can all be contributors to stability. They create mutual 
dependence and can reduce tension”.100 Therefore, Turkey’s reliance on the Iranian 
natural gas should be viewed through an “interdependence” and “cooperation” window. 
The interdependence is likely to include many actors. The Turco-Iranian natural 
gas deal not only connects Turkey and Iran, but also it is likely to connect Turkey to 
Greece and beyond. On the one hand, the contract between Turkey and Greece, which 
was signed at the end of 2002, stipulates that 285 km. long pipeline will connect the two 
countries. Greece also signed a memorandum with Iran to ensure additional Iranian gas 
supplies. Looking west, Greek State-owned Pipeline Company, DEPA, signed a contract 
with the Italian company, Edison, to establish a sub-sea pipeline between Greece and 
Italy and to the heart of Europe.101  
On the other hand, the EU/Iran Working Group on Energy met in Tehran in 
October 2002 concentrating their agenda on the energy sector. According to the Europe 
Information Services, the EU is looking to guarantee itself a “reliable long-term energy 
supplier” in exchange for opening up the European market to Iranian products and 
stepping up investments in Iran. In order to achieve that, the European Commission 
considers Turkey and Greece important for facilitating European access to the Iranian 
gas, which will diversify EU’s supplies.102 Regarding that, Turkey is the most optimum 
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route and can easily transfer natural gas from Iran to the EU. Thus the interdependence is 
not only likely to happen between Turkey and Iran, but among all the E.U., Turkey and 
Iran. 
4. Turkey-Greece Cooperation in Natural Gas Pipelines to Europe 
Turkey’s natural gas cooperation with Iran has significant implications for 
regional stability and evolution of European energy security prospects regarding Greek-
Turkish disagreements over the Aegean Sea and Turkey’s relations with the EU.103 
Turkey’s Iranian natural gas cooperation entails political and economic benefits with 
Greece. The natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Iran not only connects Iran to 
Turkey, but also Turkey to Greece. Turkey and Greece are frequently at odds with each 
other especially over Aegean Sea issues. Following the earthquakes in 1999 that hit both 
countries, a thaw in relations between Turkey and Greece started and produced some 
good headlines such as the joint visit of Greek Foreign Minister Yorgo Papandreou and 
Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem to Israel and the Palestinian territories. Strong 
evidence of rapprochement emerged in March 2002, when Turkey and Greece signed a 
contract to build a natural gas pipeline that would transfer Iranian and Azeri gas to 
Greece.104 Recently, the current Greek Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, stated that 
“our [Greek] goal is to improve bilateral cooperation with Turkey in all areas, to further 
develop relations and maintain a positive atmosphere between the peoples of the two 
countries.” In recent years, the trade volume between Greece and Turkey increased 
extensively and exceeded U.S.$1.3 billion in 2003, and 3.2 % of foreign investments in 
Turkey comes from Greece, according to Karamanlis.105 
Greece made several attempts regarding the purchase of natural gas. Greece 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran to ensure additional gas supplies. In 
addition, Greece has a declaration with Azerbaijan for cooperation in the gas sector. 
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Turkey’s central location looms large for Greece to get the gas from the Caspian and the 
Middle East.106 
 Currently, there is no pipeline between Turkey and Greece. Greece and Turkey’s 
state-owned pipeline companies, BOTAS and DEPA, will construct a 180-mile pipeline 
across land border from Ankara, Turkey to the Northern Aegean Greek port of 
Alexandropoulos due for completion by 2005, according to their contract. Additionally, 
the two countries agreed to work jointly beyond Greece towards Central Europe, Italy in 
particular.107 
The Greek-Turkish gas pipeline agreement, as a result of Turco-Iranian gas 
pipeline deal, might benefit Turkey in two areas, political and economic, since the 
pipeline deal between Greece and Turkey leads to interdependence. First, the political 
tension that has increased over the Aegean Sea from time to time might settle down 
permanently, if Turkey and Greece manage to maximize their cooperation in other issues 
as well as gas pipelines. 
Second, Turkey and Greece might consider reducing their defense expenditures in 
the Aegean Sea area following a political rapprochement, which would benefit both sides 
in an economic sense. Beside that, the transit fees of natural gas transportation to Greece 
are also likely to contribute to Turkey’s economy as a result of Turkey’s increased transit 
status, which gained impetus with the extension of the Turco-Iranian natural gas pipeline 
to Greece.108  
Turkey may also derive some other advantages from this cooperation, such as a 
possible support of Greece for Turkey’s membership to the European Union and 
increased trade relations. As Yannos Papantoniou, the Defense Minister of Greece in 
2001, declared, Greece sees Turkey as “indispensable but a long term investment of 
which Turkey’s EU membership is a cornerstone”.109 On the other side, Mesut Yılmaz, 
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the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister in 2002, called the pipeline agreement “important” 
and pointed out that “the joint efforts of Greek and Turkish businessmen would enable 
them to be advantageous in opening to Middle Eastern, Asian and East European 
markets.”110 Therefore, the Turkish-Iranian natural gas deal is the first main reason that 
might trigger rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. 
5. Russia 
Turkish-Iranian natural gas cooperation does not fit into the Russian interest in the 
region, because Iranian natural gas obtains a share in Turkish energy market. In addition, 
Iranian natural gas raises the issue of supplying Europe in gas and undermines the 
Russian monopoly of Europe’s gas imports. Therefore, the Turkish-Iranian natural gas 
agreement is less likely to serve the Russian interest as it will be further explained in the 
next chapter.  
In short, Russia’s political and economic interest stipulates that they control 
pipelines transport in Central Asian oil and gas to the world markets. In the larger sense, 
Russia puts importance on having tight integration with the Former Soviet Union 
republics, does not want them to increase their role in the Middle Asian politics, tries to 
keep the states that might change this policy out of the region and tries to increase the 
need of Central Asian republics for Russia to maintain the stability. For all these reasons, 
Russia has opposed any pipeline project in the region which does not pass through the 
Russian territory. The Turkish-Iranian natural gas pipeline is one of the projects that do 
not pass through the Russian territory and therefore undermines the Russian interest in 
Central Asia. The other project is the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline. The BTC and 
Turkey-Iran Gas pipelines offer alternative routes to the Russian pipelines to export 
Central Asia’s oil and gas and help maximize those republics to mobilize their economic 
potential.111 
However, there are some prospects where Turkey may have some advantages vis-
à-vis Russia regarding the Turkish-Iranian gas pipeline. First, Turkey might be able to 
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keep the Iranian gas supply as a trump card against Russia, because Turkey obtains a 
strategic energy source diversification in natural gas through Iranian gas agreement. 
Turkey is likely to import natural gas from Russia as long as the demand exists, and its 
imports will probably increase in absolute term. However, it is possible that Russia wants 
to ensure the Russian share in the Turkish gas market not to reduce. Because Iranian gas 
is a potential rival, Russia might pursue a more compromising stance in its bilateral 
relations with Turkey to keep its market share intact.  
Second, Turkey might obtain leverage in pipeline politics vis-à-vis Russia in the 
region given Turkey’s status as a rising energy distributor. “You have leverage, if you are 
on the critical path” argues Sarah C.Carey, a Washington attorney, who serves on the 
board of Yukos- one of the Russia’s largest petrochemical companies.112 In this sense, 
the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement is an indirect contributor to Turkey’s 
advantageous position vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, considering the political and security 
support of the United States for the pipelines, it is clear that the U.S. support even 
provides more “leverage” for Turkey. 
Given the advantage that the pipelines can grant the host territory, Turkey’s 
increased role as a major energy distributor in the region in addition to Bosporus’ 
limitations for shipping might convince Russia to transfer its oil and gas through BTC 
pipeline, which would also serve Turkey’s interest. According to Nefte Compass, Energy 
Intelligence Group’s weekly publication in oil and gas, the Kremlin sent a letter to 
Russia’s Energy Ministry asking them to perform an analysis on the proposal of 
Rosneftegasstroy, Russian Joint-Stock Company for Oil and Gas Construction, regarding 
a plan to build a pipeline from the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk to Georgia.113 
Despite the fact that an agreement has not been reached yet between Russia, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, Russia’s role is decreasing regarding the pipeline politics in the Caucasus and 
the Middle East with the increase of the BTC and Turkish-Iranian gas pipelines. 
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Third, the Turkish-Iranian natural gas cooperation might have another indirect 
benefit. If Turkey’s increasing role in pipeline politics can persuade Russia to agree to 
transport some of its oil and gas exports through BTC pipeline, it will serve to reduce the 
risk of accidents of the ships with crude oil in the Bosporus.114 
6. Security Benefits Regarding the PKK and Islamism 
The Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement’s benefits on the security level are 
internally focused from the Turkish perspective as İsmail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister 
in 2000, stated in an interview with Turkish Daily News reporter.115 As an illegal 
separatist armed organization, the PKK’s actions and the effects of the perceived Islamic 
influence from Iran are two factors that Turkey concerns about. 
In the past, Turkey and Iran had tensions over the PKK issue. Turkey accused Iran 
many times of harboring PKK militants/members and doing nothing against the PKK 
infiltrations from Iran to Turkey, which undermined Turkey’s internal security, all of 
which Iran constantly denied. During the struggle against PKK, Turkey occasionally 
turned to Iran to seek a solution for expelling alleged PKK members on its soil. In 
response to the accusations of harboring the PKK members, Iran blamed Turkey for 
violating its borders with warplanes and attacking its provinces.116 
Iran opened a good window of opportunity with the Turkish-Iranian gas 
agreement to transform its vast amount of natural gas reserves into revenues. At this 
point, there are some questions that need to be examined to determine whether Turkey 
can benefit from the Turkish-Iranian gas agreement particularly in terms of security. 
Some certain indicators must be examined to see how much Iran cares about maintaining 
its good relations with Turkey and whether they care about Turkey’s concerns.  
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There are three significant developments, which indicate that Turkey does benefit 
indirectly from the natural gas agreement in terms of security.  
The first indicator was evident in August 1999 following a security summit held 
between Turkey and Iran. Under pressure from Turkey, Iran agreed to start ‘Concomitant 
Military Operations’ against the PKK members after three days of intense talks and they 
set up a hot line to coordinate their efforts. Turkey and Iran signed the agreement during 
the Supreme Security Commission meeting, which was headed by the Turkish Interior 
Ministry Undersecretary, Yahya Gür, and the Iranian Deputy Minister of the Interior, 
Gulan Huseyin Bolandiyan. The impact of the natural gas cooperation to the security 
cooperation efforts between two countries might not be seen directly, however, the 
natural gas agreement is the first and biggest step towards increased relations between the 
two countries since the Iranian Revolution.117 
Despite the fact that an agreement about security and cooperation between Turkey 
and Iran was signed in 1992, Turkey kept complaining about that the Iranian counterparts 
did not display a commitment to prevent the PKK’s cross-border activities.118 The border 
security became specific with the gas initial agreement in 1999 between the two 
countries. However, it is worth noting that such an intense security agreement between 
Iran and Turkey did not occur prior to signing of the initial natural gas deal in 1996.119 
The relations in security issues gained new momentum on May 8th, 2001. During 
the visit of the Turkish Interior Minister, Saadettin Tantan, his Iranian counterpart, 
Mousavi-Lari drew attention to the uniqueness of the Joint Security Committee that was 
set up between the two countries.120 Security issues were top on the agenda during the 
meetings. Turkish diplomats presented to Iranian Interior Minister, Abdol Vahid 
Mussavi-Lari, a 163-page file about the activities of PKK, Hezbollah and other 
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fundamentalist groups in Iran, according the newspaper Turkish Daily News.121 This visit 
and the Turkish Foreign Minister’s visit to Iran in February 2001 helped to ease the 
relations between Turkey and Iran. When Turkish Supreme Court banned the “Islamist” 
Virtue (Fazilet) Party from the politics, this event passed without comments from the 
Iranian government and the Iranian media. Compared to the “silence” that Iranian 
government and media displayed for the ban of predecessor party, Welfare (Refah) Party, 
some 17 months ago, Iranian decision “to stay out” of the domestic issues of Turkey was 
even greater in the second event. According Robert Olson, the serenity of talks belied the 
problems concerning the completion of the gas pipeline.122 
Secondly, while the Supreme Security Commission that was set up in security 
field between Turkey and Iran continued their mission, Iran proposed that the energy 
cooperation be made in return for recognizing the PKK/KADEK as a terrorist 
organization. Even though Ankara responded to this proposal stating that it was not 
acceptable to link these two issues together, Iran’s proposition proved that maintaining 
good relations with Turkey was one of the first priorities of Iran in the bilateral relations 
with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey’s natural gas cooperation with Iran is likely to contribute 
to Turkey’s domestic security in the long term due to increased interdependence and 
shared interest.123 
Third, joint operations coordinated by the Turkish and Iranian armed forces are 
the last indicator to illustrate Iran’s commitment to maintaining good relations with 
Turkey. In June 2003, Iran and Turkey started a “simultaneous” operation after a large 
group of PKK members crossed into Iran from their camps in northern Iraq, raided an 
outpost station and killed eight Iranian soldiers, according to the Turkish newspaper 
Milliyet.124  
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The same year, the Iranian police forces held comprehensive operations against 
the PKK members in Western Iran. After the operation in November 2003, Iran 
extradited 7 PKK members, who had been kept detained since March 2003. Following 
the operation, the Iranian West province mayor stated that Iran was “decisive” in its 
fights against PKK.125 
All these developments mentioned above suggest that Iran places a significant 
importance on maintaining good relations with Turkey. The natural gas agreement creates 
the interdependence between two countries, and provides leverage to Turkey over Iran 
since Turkey is the “customer” and the “route to Europe” for the Iranian natural gas. As 
an article in the Philadelphia Inquirer argues, “if landlocked Petrolestan wants to get its 
product to a seaport in Exportonia, the route of a pipeline becomes a delicate strategic 
calculation”.126 Therefore, the agreement persuades Iran to recognize Turkey’s security 
concerns. 
The other Turkish internal security concern other than PKK was Islamism. The 
emergence of the Islamists in Turkish politics has added a lot to Turkish suspicions 
towards Iran. Even though Iran had abandoned the regime export as a policy goal at the 
end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 as I will mention in next chapter, the electoral success of 
the Islamic elements in Turkish domestic politics raised a debate about the links between 
the Islamists in Turkey and Iran due to two major domestic events.127 First, when 
Erbakan, the Turkish Prime Minister in 1996, engaged increased relations with Iran, he 
tried to involve Iran to intensify his position in Turkish politics vis-à-vis the secular 
elements in Turkey. That became the most significant domestic concern of the secular 
elite in Turkey and was perceived as a clear challenge to the secular state structure of the 
Turkish Republic.128 
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Second, the Baqeri crisis in 1997 set another reason for suspicions about Iran’s 
involvement in Islamist activities in Turkey. Briefly, the Iranian Ambassador 
Mohammad-Reza Baqeri addressed a group in Sincan, a district of Ankara, under the 
posters of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah leaders. His message included that 
those who signed an agreement with Israel and the U.S. would eventually be punished, 
implying Turkey’s Security Cooperation Agreement with Israel. Soon after his address, 
Baqeri was declared “persona non grata” as well as the Iranian consul general to Istanbul 
and Erzurum. As a response, Iran declared the Turkey’s Tehran Ambassador the same 
way afterwards.129 
Motivated with security concerns due to the U.S. opposition to the current Iranian 
regime, Iran today is more likely to follow a pragmatic policy in favor of its national 
interest over Islamic ideology. Based on the indicators, the Turkish-Iranian natural gas 
agreement is definitely one of the reasons in facilitating the interdependence and 
persuading Iran to follow a smooth policy toward Turkey, which mitigates Turkey’s 
Islamic threat concerns from Iran.130 
Commercial relations between Turkey and Iran were heavily influenced by the 
Turkish foreign policy makers’ perception about Iran. When rumors rose about 
cancellation of the pipeline projects due to tensions between Turkey and Iran as well as 
the pressures from the U.S., former Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayeti, arrived 
in Ankara and called for “moderation” between the two sides. Velayeti’s visit displays 
Iran’s willingness to give importance to maintaining good relations with Turkey due to 
the natural gas agreement.131 
Turkey is not likely to ignore its concerns as related to Iran. Instead, Turkey’s 
tendency is to exert pressure on Iran and to force Iran to face the Turkish concerns either 
through crises or dialogue. So far, Turkey appeared to have received some positive 
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responses in regards to the PKK and Islamic fundamentalism concerns, since Iran has 
displayed a policy implementation that puts the first priority on having “fraternal” ties 
with Turkey. The Turkish-Iranian gas agreement in 1996 marks a point after which the 
relations significantly increased in a very positive way. Therefore, Turkey has created a 
leverage over Iran regarding its domestic security issues taking the advantage of the gas 
agreement and is definitely using the gas agreement as a tool to achieve its policy goals.  
7. Economic Benefits 
Economically, Turkey can benefit in two areas as a result of the natural gas 
agreement with Iran: increased trade volume with Iran and maybe with the Central Asian 
Republics through Iran, and the revenues from the natural gas transit fees to Europe. 
Despite the fact that Turkey and Iran had contentions in their bilateral relations, the two 
countries have made positive studies towards cooperation. Natural gas agreement 
between Turkey and Iran is the foremost among such prospects for increased commercial 
activities due its large volume.132 
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi’s visit to Turkey in January 2000 aimed 
to increase economic and political ties with Turkey. During his visit, Kharrazi stated that 
both countries had to improve the economic and political relations, whereas his Turkish 
counterpart, İsmail Cem, said that the mutual cooperation with Iran had been developing 
during last two years. After staying two days in the capital, Kharrazi’s scheduled meeting 
with the Turkish businessmen in Istanbul, where he invited the Turkish private sector to 
Iran and through Iran to Central Asia, indicated Iran’s efforts to increase the commercial 
ties with Turkey. There is little doubt about whether the natural gas deal was an important 
aspect, since the agreement was an item on the agenda during the visit.133 
The period between 1998 and 2001 is a good example of the increase in trade 
between Turkey and Iran. According to the Turkish State Statistics Organization and 
IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency-Iran), the trade volume between Turkey and Iran 
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increased 20% between 1998 and 1999. In the first eight months of 2000, the trade 
volume achieved nearly the same amount as 1999 and it increased by 22% in 2001.134 
Turkish State Minister Kürsad Tüzmen’s visit to Tehran in October 2003 reflects 
Turkey’s willingness to improve its trade with Iran. During his visit with nearly 300 
businessmen from Turkey, the Turkish state minister stated that Turkey was committed to 
pay the price of natural gas purchased from Iran in exchange for goods or services.135 
Thus natural gas cooperation with Iran benefits Turkey by creating an increase in 
commercial ties with Iran.  
Iran’s commitment to have good relations with Western Europe is another reason 
that Turkey may benefit from its natural gas agreement with Iran. Historically, Iran has 
had an affinity towards Europe due to political and economic reasons not ideological. 
Politically, Europe was not deeply involved in Iran’s political and military affairs during 
the Shah’s Regime and it offered a temporary home to Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran, when he was forced out of Iraq at the behest of the 
Shah.136  
Economically, Iran could not afford to confront Europe and the U.S. 
simultaneously. Therefore, Europe may turn into the savior of Iran’s economy by 
becoming the most important client of Iran’s natural gas and oil resources. In relation to 
that context, Turkey offers the connection between Europe and Iran. If the object is to 
transit Iranian natural gas to Europe, Turkey is the only viable option to achieve it.137 
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8. Environmental Benefits 
Regarding the environmental concerns, the direct impact of increased natural gas 
usage instead of coal or oil in major areas, such as heating and electricity production, is 
diminished air pollution. According to a study of the PEW Center about six countries 
including Turkey, improved air quality is one of the common primary concerns in those 
six developing countries as well as economic growth and energy security. The average 
carbon dioxide intensity in Turkey is estimated to be 210 million tons in 2020 seriously 
threatening the air quality.138 Natural gas has the highest environmental value in 
replacing coal use in residential sector, power generation and industrial sector. Moreover, 
natural gas might also have a relative advantage vis-à-vis coal in areas where coal is more 
expensive and hard to utilize.139 Therefore, the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement 
might encourage the natural gas usage due to Turkey’s increased gas imports, while 
helping diminish the weather pollution. 
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IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF TURKEY’S NATURAL GAS 
COOPERATION WITH IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The framework of this chapter is to examine the possible difficulties that the 
Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement may create for the global actors in the Middle East 
and to look at the policy recommendations for Turkey’s future strategy. The chapter’s 
focus is a timeline from 1990 until today and looks at four actors: Turkey, Iran, Russia 
and the United States. It is crucial to comprehend the policy priorities of Turkey and Iran 
in order to analyze the controversy created by the increased Turkish-Iranian relations 
through the natural gas agreement. However, reviewing Turkey and Iran’s incentives is 
only a small part of the rivalry over the Middle East’s energy rich sources. In a broader 
spectrum, I also look at the American and Russian motivations.  
As explained earlier in introduction, the natural gas agreement, which was signed 
in August 1996 between Turkish Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, and Iranian Oil 
Minister, Gholamreza Agazadeh, stipulates the Iranian natural gas sales to Turkey in 
amount of 140 billion cubic feet per year.140  The need for the agreement between Turkey 
and Iran emerged as a consequence of Turkey’s growing energy need and Turkey’s 
ambitions to play a key role as well as Iran’s commercial interest as it was explained in 
previous chapter. The Turkish interest in Iran has two tracks, political/security and 
economic. The Turco-Iranian gas agreement is related to those tracks, because it creates a 
major cause for interdependency between Turkey and Iran, and makes two countries 
closer to each other in seeking solutions for their concerns. 
Of particular concern is the idea that Turkey’s natural gas deal with Iran is likely 
to disturb the Russian interest and create concerns American objectives in the region. For 
Russia, Iran’s natural gas sale to Turkey may rival Russia’s Turkish and European sales. 
Moreover, the natural gas cooperation may help Turkey to enhance its role in the Caspian 
Basin and Central Asia while undermining the significance of the Russian pipelines, 
which were the only alternative for the Central Asian Republics to export their oil and 
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gas. Thus, it can increase Turkey’s regional role. Russia’s leverage over the Former 
Soviet Union Republics would be undermined by such a development.  
For the U.S., the natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran is in conflict 
with the U.S. strategy of isolating Iran. This issue has major sides. First, the natural gas 
deal between Turkey and Iran provides gas revenues to Iran and is likely to contribute to 
Iran’s geopolitical significance in pipeline politics in the region. Iran’s key location at the 
nexus of many routes might persuade Central Asian republics to consider Iran as the only 
good option to export their oil and gas, which might also undermine the significance of 
the U.S.-supported BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline. 
Second, the effectiveness of the U.S. sanctions against Iran that are highly related 
to the U.S. security issues might diminish. Iran is perceived as a security concern by the 
United States due to its WMD acquisition efforts and sponsorship of international 
terrorism. The gas agreement between Turkey and Iran undermines the sanctions’ 
effectiveness. Therefore, Iran’s increasing influence in the region is closely watched by 
the United States.  
The key questions of this chapter are: 
• How does Turkey’s natural gas agreement with Iran effect the other states’ 
interests in the region?  
• What are the Iranian motivations in the Middle East regarding the pipeline 
politics in the region? 
• Which stance is the Russian Federation likely to take vis-à-vis increasing 
Turkish-Iranian relations in the long term and how likely are the U.S.-
Turkey relations to be effected by the natural gas agreement between 
Turkey and Iran?  
Turkey is one of the most important countries in the Middle East regarding its 
geopolitical importance in energy and security issues. Therefore, I will first examine the 
Turkish and Iranian foreign policy priorities in the Middle East as well as the overall 
policy incentives. Then I will explore the policy objectives of Russia and the United 
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States. Finally, I will suggest some policy recommendations for Turkey to maintain its 
good relations with its ally, the U.S., and neighbors, Russia and Iran. 
1. Turkey 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey faced a more troubled environment in 
its region than it did during the Cold War. The events in Turkey’s peripheries 
complicated the environmental and security uncertainties about its future. These 
uncertainties have further increased as a result of Turkey’s own economic crises and 
political turmoil.141 
Turkish foreign policy shifted at the end of the Cold War from a passive stand to 
active involvement. While Turkey had been the buffer state against the Soviet 
expansionist policies in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, it consciously 
eschewed efforts to cultivate contacts with the Turkic and Muslim nationalities under the 
USSR. However, later Turkey saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to 
increase its influence through intensified relations with the new Turkic Republics and 
enhance its strategic importance to the West.142 
Turkey’s growing policy of involvement in the Middle East was focused on 
internal security concerns, which were based upon two major perceptions. The PKK 
separatism from Northern Iraq, Syria and Iran was only one half of the equation. The 
other was the linkage between the Islamist line in Turkish politics, especially during 
Erbakan’s terms, and the activities of the fundamentalists in the Middle East.143 Bulent 
Aliriza, the Director of Turkish Studies at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) in Washington, said in 1997 that “they were [Iranians] pouring fuel onto 
the internal fire in Turkey” referring the Iranian Ambassador Baqeri’s call for an Islamic 
state during a gathering to mark the Jerusalem day in Sincan, an outskirt province of 
Ankara.144 A reporter of Hürriyet Newspaper, Sedat Ergin said that “majority of Turks 
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were frustrated that a coalition headed by an Islamic prime minister was running the 
country”. He also added that “the military, universities, bar associations, the mainstream 
press, business chambers and two major labor confederations, all engaged in this 
endeavor to overthrow the government. It was a ‘strange’ coalition from a democratic 
perspective” according to Ergin, referring Erbakan’s ban from the politics in 1997. The 
same concern was expressed by the former Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen, 
referring the acceptance of the military’s pressure for secularism, by saying that “it [the 
military] was fine, because there is no other way to stop the political class from granting 
concessions to the fundamentalists, which is the greatest threat to Turkey”.145 
The Gulf War in 1990 gave a new impetus to the shift in Turkish Foreign Policy 
about the Middle East. Turkey adopted a very active stance as a part of the Gulf War 
coalition with a decision in August 1990 to shut down critical Iraqi oil pipelines. The 
absence of the Cold War conditions meant that Turkey would be able to pursue a more 
active, pro-Western policy without the concern of the Russian factor.146 
The aftermath of the Gulf War proved that this coalition was costly. Turkey lost 
U.S.$ 7 Billion annually according to the World Bank as pipeline fees, trade revenues 
coming from Iraq, in banking sector, tourism, defense expenditures as well as losses due 
to increase of the oil prices.147 Turkey’s losses due to the U.N. sanctions were never 
adequately compensated afterwards, while the Gulf War policy never came to fruition in 
political benefits with the U.S. and Europe as President Özal expected, such as some 
advantages in Turkey’s admission to the European Commission (EC) and economic aids 
from the United States and Gulf countries due to the economic losses as a result of 
Turkey’s oil and trade cuts with Iraq.148 The end of the Gulf War did not only contribute 
to Turkey’s economic problems, but also to the internal security concerns. The No-Fly-
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Zone in the North of Iraq after the Gulf War created a power vacuum that facilitated the 
PKK’s political violence.149 
2. Iran 
Iranian economic incentives provided the reasons for increased commercial 
relations with Turkey throughout the 80s. Despite the Iranian relations with Turkey after 
1990 displayed the continuity of those during the 80s, Iran went through some 
modifications in its foreign policy objectives that intensified its commercial efforts 
towards Turkey following the Iran-Iraq War and facilitated the conditions to materialize 
the natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran. 
Despite its frequent and continued revolutionary pronouncements, Iran has 
become a more pragmatic and rational actor that adopted a foreign policy based on the 
calculations of its national interest especially vis-à-vis Turkey. The Iranian political dual 
personality derives from the conflicting character of the moderate elements in Iranian 
domestic politics and the self-defeating statements of the Mullahs. The struggle still 
continues today; however, an ideological approach on the issues is less likely than a 
pragmatic one as it will be explained later.150  
Iranian foreign policy can be understood as pragmatic, regional and realist. First, 
it was pragmatic, because the beginning of the 1990s brought a watershed to the Middle 
East as Iran viewed that period as a window of opportunities to increase its influence in 
neighboring countries. Iran’s struggle to export Islamic principles replaced itself with two 
policy priorities due to two reasons: The political consolidation of the regime and 
economic reconstruction of the country. On the one hand, the need for the political 
consolidation of the regime emerged as a result of the Iranian Revolution’s Supreme 
Leader’s death, Ayatollah Khomeini. After Khomeini’s death, the political establishment 
of the Islamic Republic moved quickly to consolidate Supreme Leader’s position to 
ensure the political stability of the state. A smooth succession from Khomeini to Ali 
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Khamenei became a concern, since Khamenei “lacked” the qualifications for the post and 
the charisma of Khomeini.151  
On the other, the need for the economic reconstruction of the country surfaced 
due to Iran-Iraq War’s socioeconomic consequences and Rafsanjani’s economic goals. 
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, a vast national welfare network was created to 
benefit the families of the victims of the Iran-Iraq War. The main eligibility criterion 
became the loyalty to the regime and had to be supported by the regime to maintain the 
popular support of the Iranian people. Besides, Rafsanjani’s goal to achieve a network of 
commercial self-interest that was centered on “merchant class” defined the agenda of the 
Iranian governance. Both reasons required Iran to seek new economic opportunities.152 
The “new” economic opportunities did not emerge until 1990. The disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1990 created many new opportunities with the independence of the 
former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Such new neighbors in the 
Iranian vicinity changed the Iranian motivations to follow new policy priorities in its 
neighborhood rather than vague ideological principles. All given circumstances led Iran 
to pursue a pragmatic policy to achieve its goals.153 
Second, Iranian foreign policy was a regional foreign policy in the sense that Iran 
gave the first priority to increase the relations with the non-Arab states in the region, 
especially Turkey, following the Gulf War. The relations between Iran and the Arab 
states in the Persian Gulf were undermined by mutual distrust. The rising status of the 
U.S. in the Gulf after the Gulf War and Iran’s anti-American stance had polarized Iran 
and GCC States (Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf - Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates).154  
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Fearing of the isolation in the Middle East, Iran turned to non-Arab countries in 
the West, North and East. Iranian interest in establishing good relations with Turkey was 
especially important due to two basic reasons. First, Turkey had close ties with the West 
and Iran was willing to export its vast energy resources and increase its trade activities 
with Europe. Second, the Russian influence over the landlocked Central Asian states was 
overwhelming, leaving Iran little room for competition. Those states were struggling to 
become independent from Russia in political and economic issues.155 
Third, Iranian foreign policy conformed to realist international relations readings 
of events because Iran faced security challenges in the region. In fact, Iran’s security 
concerns started with Saddam’s aggression in the region and coupled with the perception 
of the American support for Saddam Hussein. After the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 
1988, Iran needed stability in the region to consolidate its regime and achieve economic 
development. However, Iran’s perceived security concerns did not improve. The Iranian 
expectations for stability in the region vanished in the early 1990s as a result of four 
important developments: the Soviet Union disintegrated creating a vacuum in Central 
Asia and Caucasus. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait resulted in more American 
military presence in the Gulf. Following that, Saddam stayed in power after the Gulf War 
and continued to be a security concern for Iran. Finally, anti-Iran Taliban toppled the 
Afghan regime in 1992. Thus, Iran’s pure national security concerns grew more in early 
1990s.156 
September 11th attacks on the U.S. homeland brought radical changes to the U.S. 
foreign policy, and Iran came under focus more than before as a result of that change. 
Everything came as a surprise, as the U.S. saw the unexpected fall of the Shah from 
power, and faced American hostage crisis in Iran. The social discontent and social events 
in the Middle East were not given a high priority, as it did not happen in Iran before the 
Islamic Revolution. Oil-based politics with the Gulf countries was abandoned, since it 
brought a high humanitarian cost on 9/11. Cold War’s communist threat was replaced by 
the Islamic fundamentalism and terror turned into the major concern of the U.S. in 
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international arena. When terror became the major issue, Iran was one of the countries, 
which were held responsible for supporting terrorism. The “Axis of Evil” speech of 
President Bush even exacerbated the Iranian security concerns further.157 
In one aspect, Iran was a winner in the post-September 11th environment. The 
Iranian “cooperative” efforts surfaced in two areas in afterwards of September 11th. 
Iranian efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and to contain Saddam Hussein made Iran an 
invisible ally to the United States. In Afghanistan, Iran did not oppose the overthrow of 
the “anti-Iranian” Taliban regime. Moreover, Iran even facilitated the advance of the 
Northern Alliance, the opposition group of Taliban regime, provided continuous cross-
border support for opposition groups and diplomatic ties for the new Afghan government, 
and Iranian President Khatami quickly recognized Afghanistan’s Karzai Government 
following the overthrow of Taliban. In the aftermath of Taliban, the United Nations 
World Food Programme (WFP) appreciated the efforts of Iranian Custom Administration 
for facilitating the transport of goods and commodities to Afghan people via the Iranian 
territory.158 
Regarding Iraq, Iranian navy closed the Straits of Hurmuz to the vessels that were 
trying to smuggle oil and other products from Iraq on the eve of American invasion of 
Iraq. This was a significant contribution to the U.S. efforts to contain Saddam. Iran 
allowed the Iraqi Shiite Cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Al-Hakim that was exiled by 
Saddam Regime to Tehran, to work with the American sponsored efforts to organize the 
Iraqi resistance. In addition, Iran helped to destabilize Saddam Regime that would cause 
collapsing of the Iranian opposition group in Iraq, the Mudjahedeen al Khalq.159 For all 
those reason, the U.S. and Iran had an overlapping interest in getting rid of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This “indirect” cooperation might, 
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perhaps, persuade the U.S. to recognize Iran’s strategic interest in the Middle East and 
Central Asia. It might possibly soften the U.S. policies against Iran.160 
Turkey and Iran saw a common interest in natural gas agreement in the mid 1990s 
with the increased security issues even though the pipeline prospects between Turkey and 
Iran were not new. Despite Turkey’s disputes over Iranian favoritism for PKK, 
Hezbollah, and Islamist elements in Turkey in earlier period, energy trade offered a focal 
point for cooperation for both countries. Moreover, the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
pushed Turkey and Iran to each other in regards to their internal stability. Before OIF in 
2003, Turkey did not share the same policy objectives with the U.S. towards Iraq as 
Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Yaşar Yakış, told CNN International that “the Turkish 
government asked the American side about the emergence of a Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq, because it was one of the very important questions.”161 Turkey’s skepticism about 
“secret” U.S. plans for a Kurdish state in Iraq was the same concern that Iran worried 
about.162 When 20 Iranian Kurdish Members of the Iranian Parliament sent open letters 
to the EU leaders and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, they also expressed concern in 
a separate message to President Mohammad Khatami about Iran’s silence for a “possible” 
entering of the Turkish troops into northern Iraq.163 
Given the Iranian foreign policy priorities since late 1980s, Iran’s current primary 
goal is to maximize its commercial interest in surrounding countries. Natural gas 
agreement is a win-win project for Turkey and Iran. However, there might be some 
implications that are exposed by Iran, which might affect Turkey negatively. 
Despite the common interest of the Turkish-Iranian natural gas cooperation, Iran 
is a competitor of Turkey in economic issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The 
Turkish-Iranian gas agreement is likely to enhance Iran’s strategic importance as one of 
the major routes for Central Asia’s economic activities. If Iran can handle mobilizing 
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Central Asia’s economic potential, it may emerge as another big player besides Russia 
and China. Besides, that would reduce Turkey’s role in Central Asia and the Caucasus.   
Turkey signed an agreement to buy natural gas from Turkmenistan, and Iran is the 
transit country between Turkey and Turkmenistan. Iranian connection may pose a risk of 
weakening the future of the U.S. and Turkey-supported BTC pipeline. The BTC pipeline 
aims to provide an export route to Central Asian republics for oil and gas by avoiding 
Iranian and Russian territory as transit country. The U.S. argues that “the swaps [from 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Iran] are a mechanism that takes much-needed oil 
supplies away from the future of the East-West pipeline, namely BTC.164 Turkey does 
not have much to offer to Turkic republics in Central Asia financially. Iran’s economic 
power is even worse than that of Turkey. However, Iran has a trade and pipeline offer, 
which is not dependent on Iran’s financial ability. That might turn to Iran’s advantage.165 
In addition to that, if Iran increases its significance for Central Asian Republics, it 
might also affect Turkey’s cultural objectives in the region. During his recent visit to 
Uzbekistan on May 19th, 2004, one of the issues on agenda of Kamal Kharrazi, Iranian 
Foreign Minister, was promoting the “Persian language” in Uzbekistan and safeguarding 
Iran’s cultural heritage in Uzbekistan.166 Iran’s emphasis on shared religious belief and 
“Islamic universalism” is a factor that might reduce Turkey’s ethno-linguistic 
commonalities and affect those countries’ integration to the West.167  
3. Russia 
Russia went through a change in its policy towards the Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. The initial policy did not dictate a close attention at the Central Asian 
Republics. According to some Russian leaders, the economic reforms were more 
important than paying attention to Eurasia, because it would slow down the 
implementation of successful economic policies. However, in mid-1990s, Russia changed 
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its policy based on one significant factor: Russia feared that it would lose its position in 
its near abroad, where it once assumed a sphere of influence. Moreover, the conflict in 
Chechnya turned quickly into a war, threatened Russia’s interest on the oil and gas 
resources as well as pipelines that go through the Caspian, and raised the concern of 
Islamic extremism. For those basic concerns, Russian Energy Policy was concentrated on 
preventing foreign intrusion on the pipeline politics that would decrease the dependency 
of the Central Asian Republics in oil and gas exports, as explained in Chapter III.168 
Russia maintains good relations with Turkey in general. There are three major 
reasons for Russia to maintain good relations with Turkey. All are based on the economic 
issues. First, Turkey is the largest trading partner with Russia in the region. Second, 
Turkey is a major customer for the Russian gas, purchasing nearly 20% of its gas exports. 
Third, Russia sells military equipment to Turkey such as armored personnel carriers and 
helicopters. Russia has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey due to 
trade ranging between US$10-12 Billion a year, and natural gas sale to Turkey is the real 
incentive to promote the trade relations.169 
Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement comes into a direct conflict with the 
Russian interest for four different reasons, and Russia may turn towards to Central Asia 
and the Caspian Basin as a result of its undermined interest by Turkish-Iranian gas 
agreement. In Central Asia, increased cooperation between Iran and Turkey through 
pipelines may reduce the Russian influence over the landlocked Central Asian Turkic 
States such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Those former Soviet republics 
are dependent on Russian pipeline structure in order to export their oil and gas. However, 
the agreement between Iran and Turkey creates a window of opportunity for those 
republics, because Iran-Turkey gas pipeline offers an alternative outlet route for their oil 
and gas exports. Thus, it hurts Russian economic interest over Central Asia.170  
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With regards to Russia’s objectives, Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement may 
persuade Russia to increase its influence on the Central Asian states, since Turkish-Iran 
natural gas pipeline creates a good alternative to the Russian pipelines for the Central 
Asian republics. The Central Asian republics are still of great importance for Russia due 
to their energy sources. First, September 11 attacks on the U.S. created an opportunity for 
Russia to reassert its influence on the peripheral states using the issue of war against 
international terrorism. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. National Security Advisor 
to the Carter Administration, states that “Russia has seen its Muslim neighbors as a 
source of a potentially explosive political and demographic threat, and the Russian 
political elite was increasingly susceptible to anti-Islamic religious and racist appeals”. 
According to him, September 11 attacks on the U.S. turned into an issue that President 
Putin was able to exploit in order to restore the Russian influence on the Central Asian 
states. Especially, the last incident in Uzbekistan in which nearly 40 people died 
illustrates an example how Russia exploits terror actions to restore its presence in Central 
Asian Republics.171 In this context, Turkish-Iranian gas deal may create another concern 
for Russian interest, persuade Russia to attempt to increase its influence on the Central 
Asian countries, destabilize them as Russia did in 1993 for Turkmenistan, and in 1994 for 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, as I shall explain later in American context. Such attempts in 
the future would undermine the Turkish and U.S. interest of encouraging the economic 
independence of the Central Asian republics.172   
Second, Russia might perceive the Iranian natural gas sale to Turkey as a negative 
effect that would decrease Russia’s gas sales to Turkish and European market. One aspect 
of this issue is that Russia’s supremacy in Turkey’s natural gas supplies faces a 
challenge, because Iran virtually has the capacity to replace the Russian supplies to 
Turkey in an event of a possible cutoff in gas supplies from Russia. Iran’s capacity has a 
potential alternative to Russia’s economic interest, since such a cutoff in the Blue Stream 
pipeline is not out of possibility regarding the Black Sea’s sulfur rich corrosive water for 
pipelines. Moreover, Central Asia’s natural gas sources will also be available in the 
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future based on the signed contracts with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Therefore, the 
gas pipeline between Turkey and Iran reduces Russia’s role regarding natural gas sales.  
Another aspect is that Turkey’s ambition to become an energy hub in the region 
will eventually enable Iranian gas sales to Europe. It can also have a positive impact on 
Europe’s energy security diversifying the gas supplies, once Iranian gas sales to Europe 
takes place. Both markets are vitally important to Russia’s economy. Therefore, Russia is 
less likely to welcome the well being of the Turco-Iranian gas agreement, despite the fact 
that the Russian gas supplies still have an importance and the sales from Russia to Turkey 
are likely to continue based on Turkey’s gas need for its long term goals. 
Finally, the Turkey-Iran natural gas cooperation may create a leverage in favor of 
Turkey vis-à-vis Russia as I mentioned in Chapter III, since Russia and Iran are potential 
competitors as major natural gas and oil producers. Therefore, Russia would be looking 
for ways to balance this agreement between Turkey and Iran in the long term. Turkey’s 
current natural gas share in Russia’s natural gas exports is large enough to have a 
leverage reaching nearly one fifth of Russia’s total gas exports. Turkey can benefit from 
Iranian and Russian gas in a critical situation as alternative to each other. However, a 
weakening in Russia’s relations with Turkey may direct Russia towards the Caspian 
Basin and Central Asia to seek more influence. Both disturb the Turkish interest in the 
region.173 
Any possible development regarding the Turkish-Iranian gas agreement that 
would severely hurt the Russian interest in oil and pipelines may direct Russia to BTC 
pipeline, which is Turkey’s top priority among the pipeline projects. The BTC is passing 
Azerbaijan, which is another Turkic state with many common cultural values, and 
Georgia, which Turkey always considered friendlier than Armenia. In order to retaliate, 
Russia is much likely to choose the easiest spot in the Caucasus, Georgia.  
Russia may attempt to destabilize Georgia through Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
regions in the north and Ajaria in the South of the country as it did in 1994, when Russia 
tried to prevent Georgia from signing the BTC agreement. Russia reduced the natural gas 
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transfers, cut the electricity, and backed the Abkhazia and Ajaria separatist movement to 
destabilize Georgia in 1994.174 Those separatist provinces always held a potential to rebel 
against the Georgian government. With its 5.4 million populations, Georgia has many 
pro-Russian interest groups such as the large shareholders in energy assets that facilitate 
Russian efforts. The country is also witnessing the competition of two superpowers, 
Russia and the U.S., in this South California-size country, because of the strategic 
importance due to BTC pipeline that would connect Central Asia to the Caucasus and 
eventually to the western markets.175 
4. The United States 
Even though the issues related to the United States are covered in this chapter 
under “difficulties of Turkey’s Iranian natural gas deal”; the United States neither 
displayed an overwhelming opposition to the Turkish-Iranian natural gas cooperation, nor 
an alignment with it in the aftermath of the agreement signing. However, the Turkish-
Iranian natural gas cooperation created some consequences that help U.S. policies in the 
region. The U.S. faced a dilemma regarding the Turco-Iranian energy relationship in the 
light of its interests. There were two major reasons for the U.S. to acquiesce to the 
Turkish-Iranian gas cooperation. First, the United States has an interest in Turkey’s 
stability and development that helped justify the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement. 
Turkey is not only receiving a substantial amount of natural gas for its industrial 
development through this deal, but also will receive significant transit fees once the 
natural gas sales to Europe starts. Moreover, Turkey is the best model for the U.S. to 
show that Islam and democracy are compatible with each other. Therefore, it is in the 
U.S. interest to tolerate the Turkey’s gas deal with Iran.  
The U.S. opposes Iranian involvement in energy projects in the region, based on a 
concern that “the deals would provide Iran revenues to support terrorism”, a charge that 
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Tehran repeatedly denied.176  In the broader sense, the U.S. follows a containment 
strategy over Iran due to Iran’s support of international terrorism, its opposition to the 
Arab Israeli Peace Process, and its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. 
However, the U.S. tolerated the gas deal between Turkey and Iran because of the 
priorities of keeping Turkey politically and economically stable.177   
Second, the United States has an interest in strengthening the economic and 
political independence of the Former Soviet Union republics in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Those Central Asian states are dependent on the pipelines that go through the 
Russian territory for their oil and gas exports to world markets. Iran’s proximity to 
Central Asia facilitates the U.S. objectives to reduce dependency on the Russian route 
since Iran offers an outlet route to Persian Gulf for those republics to conduct their 
commercial activities. The Iranian route is the only existing alternative route to the 
Russian pipelines. Before September 11th, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, National Security 
Advisor to President Carter, argued that a “good strategic relationship with Iran was 
important in the long run, if the U.S. wanted not only stability in the Persian Gulf, but 
also access to Central Asia.”178 In the aftermath of September 11th, the importance of 
Iran’s geographic location increased dramatically due to the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
the War in Iraq.  
Geographically, “Iran sits at the heart of a region that has long been important to 
U.S. security concerns” according to Senator Joe Biden. If Iran evolves in a more 
democratic direction and the relations between the U.S. and Iran improve as a result of 
this change, then the security concerns of the United States are much likely to improve. 
The struggle between the conservative and moderate elements in Iranian politics is still 
going on today. However at this moment, “the United States is not in a position to have a 
major impact on this struggle. Nor should we [the U.S.] intervene in any direct way” as 
Senator Biden argued in his address to the Iranian-American Council referring to the 
strained relations between the Iranians and the U.S. that have been in existence ever since 
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the CIA’s intervention during 1953 coup. The 1953-coup raised suspicions among the 
Iranians against the U.S. after restoring the Shah’s power, and such suspicions lingered 
ever since. Therefore currently, the U.S. has a limited option in benefiting from the 
Iranian people to persuade Iran to a moderate line, and thus the economic sanctions are 
the only viable option.179 
The United States policy regarding the natural gas agreement between Turkey and 
Iran is largely related to a security concern rather than an economic one. The U.S.-Iranian 
relations have been constrained by the Islamic Revolution’s uncompromising attitude and 
the 1979 American hostage crisis. Since then, the U.S. has tried to limit Iran’s political 
and economic progress on the basis that it provided support for international terrorism. 
Moreover, Russian nuclear technology sales to Iran raised the weapons of mass 
destruction concerns and intensified the U.S. efforts to limit Iran further. In August 1996, 
the U.S. signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) that prevented U.S. companies from 
investing more than $40 million in Iran’s energy sector, and imposed unilateral sanctions 
on foreign companies that invested the same amount.180 The U.S. opposes any energy 
delivery project that includes Iran in order to stop the flow of money to this country. 
Iran’s uncompromising stance in the Middle East Peace Process and security issues in the 
region are at the core of the U.S. concern.181 
The initial reaction of the Clinton administration to the Turkish-Iranian gas 
initiatives was “disapproving.” The then U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
stated that the gas agreement between Iran and Turkey was not “good business.” 
However, the U.S. did not put pressure on Turkey in an attempt to persuade Turkey to 
give up the Iranian natural gas deal for reasons explained earlier. Some key political 
reasons also played a role in U.S. acquiescence. First, the U.S. sanctions on Iran did not 
“conform” to the economic and political realities. The ILSA, as a U.S. unilateral action, 
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did not receive a positive response from European allies of the United States. France, 
Germany and the E.U. denounced the U.S. action, and clearly expressed that they would 
not yield to the U.S. demands to cut the economic enterprises in Iran. For instance, the 
U.S. yielded, when the French Oil Company, Total, replaced the American oil company, 
Conoco. Moreover, the U.S. did not oppose Turkey’s gas deal with Iraq during Saddam’s 
reign long before the Turkish-Iranian natural gas deal, despite the fact that Saddam was 
the worst enemy of the United States.182 
Second, Turkish officials argued that the natural gas pipelines did not involve any 
Turkish investment in the Iranian petrochemical industry, since Iran was responsible for 
building the part of the pipeline in Iranian territory on its own. Technically, this argument 
was right in the line with the ILSA’s purpose of preventing foreign investments from 
being involved in Iran’s oil and gas industry.183 
Third, Turkey appeased the U.S. by making a gas deal with Turkmenistan. Even 
though Iran was the transit country, Turkey argued that the transit fees would not 
contribute to the Iranian economy. Besides, Iran-Turkey pipelines would provide 
Turkmenistan a strong alternative to the Russian pipeline and would make Turkmenistan 
less dependent on Russian export lines, which was one of the U.S. objectives in Central 
Asia.184 
Fourth, the U.S. wanted to keep its ties strong with Turkey’s pro-Islamic coalition 
government at the time the deal was signed. As a NATO member and a major ally, the 
U.S. feared that the energy sector and investments in Turkey would be tied to Iran in the 
mid-1990s by the Refah Party, an inexperienced Islamist party leading the government. 
Thus, the natural gas initial agreement was signed between Turkey and Iran on August 
8th, 1996 despite the American concerns.185  
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While signing the natural gas agreement with Iran, Turkey was carefully watching 
its relations with the United States, because Turkey’s goal to become integrated with the 
West always favored the preservation of good Turkish-American relations. Nonetheless, 
in order to revive its economy, Turkey had to increase its cooperation with its neighbors, 
which the U.S. recognized. Therefore, Turkey’s economic and political interest prevailed 
vis-à-vis other factors.186 
5. Why is Central Asia Important for the United States? 
The U.S. considerations regarding Turkey were the first half of the equation for 
tolerating the Turkish-Iranian gas pipeline agreement. The second part of the equation 
was related to the U.S. interest in the Former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. In order to understand the compromising U.S. stance vis-à-vis Turkey’s gas 
cooperation with Iran, two reasons that show Central Asia’s importance must be 
understood clearly. 
The first reason is the Central Asia’s Muslim demographic structure that gained 
importance due to changes in the U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. experienced a surprise in 
its relations with the Muslim world in the Persian Gulf. The emphasis of the U.S. policy 
in the Middle East had been oil oriented with little attention to social and demographic 
structure until September 11th, 2001. Consisted of 15 Saudi, 2 UAE nationals, 1 Egyptian 
and 1 Lebanese, 19 hijackers in total shook the confidence of the U.S. towards their oil 
allies in the Gulf on that fateful day. In the aftermath of 9/11, the future direction of U.S.-
Gulf countries relations, especially with Saudi Arabia, was thrown into question, 
becoming more fragile and more central because of heightened U.S. national security 
concerns. As O. Faruk Logoğlu, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, said in a 
seminar at RAND, “September 11 alerted us to many different problems as well as 
possibilities”. Consequently, the U.S. ended up with a change in its strategy that was 
solely based on oil. The need to understand the culture and cultural dynamics in the 
Middle East became a strong focus of the U.S. foreign policy.187 
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Despite the long-term tradition of an oil relationship between the U.S. and Gulf 
countries since the beginning of the Cold War, the absence of depth in bilateral relations 
was proven when the U.S. national security concerns grew on September 11th. Despite 
the long term relations between the U.S. and Gulf countries, the focus was only the oil. 
The attacks on September 11th increased the need for addressing the issue of 
“fundamentalism” in social issues in the Middle East and search for alternative energy 
sources for the U.S. and global energy security, while the U.S. maintained the relations 
with the Gulf supplies.188 
Why did Central Asia become so important to the U.S. regarding its national 
security concerns? The Muslim states in Eurasia currently have a population of 295 
million, and are likely to grow to more than 450 million by 2025 due to high birth rates. 
Because Central Asia will have a large young population in the future, they will be 
determinants of the political and economic order and disorder. Islam had not emerged as 
a powerful factor in the politics in Central Asia yet. Central Asia’s Muslims that practice 
the Sufi school of Islam have a more moderate attitude compared to the Muslims, who 
practice the Wahhabi school of Islam that is stricter in Islamic interpretations than the 
Sufi school, in the Middle East. However, Central Asian politics still holds the potential 
to emerge as “extremist,” if the social and economic integration of the republics cannot 
be succeeded. Therefore, the success of absorbing those people into an economic and 
social system is the central focus for global stability, since they are connecting two 
significant areas, the Western World to the Far East.189  
Central Asia is also close to the hotbed of “Islamic fundamentalists” in 
Afghanistan with whom the U.S. is currently fighting. The southeastern rim of Eurasia 
has the potential for some of the most dangerous ethnic and religious interstate wars. 
There are extremist groups that seek weapons of mass destruction. The policies there are 
a source for fanatical, fundamentalist militancy to which some states might share their 
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weapons. In addition, the area contains three quarters of the world’s poor population, and 
it poses a potential threat for instability.190 Contrary to Afghanistan’s Taliban-like 
extremists, the Sufi tradition of Islam has been dominant among the Muslims in Central 
Asia’s Turkic Republics. Even though it might be capable of injecting great religious 
influence into the politics, the Sufi tradition in Central Asia is still less militant than the 
one in Afghanistan and the Middle East. There are three reasons that might explain it: 
first, the Turkic republics in Central Asia lived under the Soviet Union for a long time 
and still have a “socialist” approach towards the religious issues. Second, Turkey, which 
defends the separation of the state and the mosque, is the successful secular Muslim state 
example for those republics. Third, the history of the Central Asian states is relatively 
short, since they became independent after 1990. Therefore, they have not experienced 
much interaction with social and religious issue in the region and in the Muslim world. 
Thus, the people in those republics still did experience many incidents to have resentment 
against the West. Therefore, securing the moderate approach of the Central Asia’s 
Muslim population has crucial implications for the global security as well as the security 
of the United States.191 
The second reason concerns the vast oil and gas reserves that make Central Asia 
important for the rest of the world. The Cold War proved how important the oil and gas 
reserves in the Middle East were. The experiences of the oil crisis in 1973, the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 and Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 showed clearly that the 
energy security of the whole world was vulnerable. Therefore, securing and diversifying 
the energy supplies became an important concern. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Central Asia’s Newly Independent States (NIS) gained importance due to their 
vast amounts of oil and gas reserves. According to the Energy Information 
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Administration’s (EIA) data, the region possesses 26 percent of the world’s proven oil, 
and 12 percent of the natural gas reserves.192 
In addition to that, the United States has commercial interests in the region. 
Among the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan constitutes the economic interest of the U.S. 
in the north of the region, since a U.S. company, Chevron, was the first oil company to 
have signed a contract in the region’s most resource-rich country. Kazakhstan’s proven 
gas reserves alone are more than those of Norway, Europe's largest gas reserve owner. 
Even though the current reserves fall behind those of Norway, the estimated reserves are 
two-three times of those of Norway. Besides, unlike Azerbaijan, Kazakh oil and gas 
production is onshore, and that reduces the risk of a fight over its resources in the 
Caspian dramatically. It also reduces the cost of petrochemical production.193   
6. The U.S. Policy Objectives in Central Asia and the Caspian 
Given the reasons for the region’s importance, Stephen Sestanovich, the U.S. 
Ambassador at Large for the New Independent States, summarizes the U.S. policy in 
Central Asia and the Caspian as follows: first, strengthening modern political and 
economic institutions, and encouraging the independent and prosperous Central Asian 
and Caspian states; second, conflict resolution to avoid fighting for natural resources; 
third, energy development and enhancing global energy security; fourth, security 
cooperation and fostering linkages among countries.194 
The United States opposes any domination of a single state over the others in the 
region in regards to natural sources. Russia, China and Iran are the major countries 
causing concern for U.S. policy. The region is so crucial for the global domination that 
the U.S. cannot give up for the sake of global stability and security, since the region is in 
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the middle of the Western World and the Far East, both of which are two of the world’s 
most developed regions.195  
In order to achieve the political and economic independence of the New 
Independent States (NIS), the U.S. supports the pipeline projects that do not pass through 
either Russian or Iranian territory. The pipelines have key roles to play to achieve 
economic and political development, since they can provide oil and gas revenues to the 
region. In addition to that, the U.S. seeks various means to limit a “possible” Russian and 
Chinese domination in the region by implementing investments through the U.S. 
companies.196 
Russia is the main threat to the political and economic independence of the NIS. It 
dictates to the Central Asian and Caucasus Republics to export their oil and gas through 
Russian pipelines and uses them as a card against the Former Soviet Republics. Russia 
also seeks to create debts for those republics, so that it can receive the debt as shares in 
petrochemical refining and processing facilities as payment. If not, Russia tries to 
minimize the alternative lines. Moreover, Russia attempts to destabilize the countries 
politically, if the countries resist further.197 
There are several examples for Russian efforts to influence Central Asian and 
Caspian republics. First, Russia undermined Turkmenistan’s stability by cutting Turkmen 
gas deliveries to Europe in 1993, when Turkmenistan sought alternative pipelines for 
their exports. Second, Russia cut the deliveries of Kazakh oil completely in 1994, when 
Kazakhstan hesitated on the proposal of delivering the oil from Tengiz fields only 
through Novorossiysk. The country came to the brink of civil war due to this economic 
crisis. Third, Russia tried to prevent Azerbaijan from signing the BTC pipeline proposal 
at the end of 1994. When Elçibey resisted, Russia cut the oil transfer to Novorossiysk 
from Azerbaijan. When the cuts did not work, Russia supported armed rebellions among 
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the local leaders attempting to plot a coup against the government. Though Elçibey was 
unseated from the government, the BTC proposal was signed by Aliyev.198 Therefore, 
pipelines that bypass Russia and Iran are the major purpose of the U.S. policy. This goal 
was embodied with the signing of the BTC pipeline agreement, which is planned to be 
finished in 2005. 
7. How Does the Turkish-Iranian Natural Gas Agreement Serve the U.S. 
Interest? 
(a) In Turkey 
Given all the obstacles to the U.S. interests in Central Asia and Caucasus, 
the Turkish-Iranian natural gas pipeline has two important consequences that serve the 
U.S. strategic interest, such as Turkey’s development and Turkish efforts in helping the 
Turkic republics in Central Asia. First, the U.S. has an immense interest in a politically 
and economically stable and stronger Turkey. Regarding the continuing Turkish-
American alliance forged at the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey is the best example in 
the Muslim world today that the United States can promote as a successful achievement 
model of a secular Muslim and democratic country. Benefiting economically from the 
natural gas agreement with Iran and improving its economy, Turkey demonstrates a clear 
example of a modern, secular and successful state not only for the Iranian people, which 
undermines the fundamentalist ideological inspirations, but also for the New Independent 
States in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For Iran, It is possible that the Iranian people 
might receive the U.S. messages to promote democracy and liberty with suspicion. 
However, Turkey has a greater chance to interact with the Iranian regime and people to 
promote those values implicitly, since the two countries represent similar values and had 
similar tendencies in the past, as explained in Chapter II. In addition to Iran, the Turkic 
republics in Central Asia are also the important to promote the moderate views for 
flourishing of the modern political institutions as the U.S. aims.  
Second, Turkey engaged in cultural activities in Central Asia. Turkish 
investments in telecommunications and the promotion of Latinization of the alphabet in 
Central Asia had extensive cultural effects and facilitated the integration of the region to 
the Western World. In addition, Turkey accepted thousands of students for high 
                                                 
198 S.Frederick Star, “Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian,” The National Interest, Spring 
1997. 
90 
education from those republics, and provided education for their army officers at Turkish 
institutions to encourage the independence of the Central Asian and Caspian states. The 
Turkish-Iranian gas pipeline connects Turkey to Turkmenistan. While increasing its 
significance for Turkmen gas exports as a consumer199 and a transit route to the West 
through Iranian pipelines, Turkey might be able to maximize its cultural influence in 
Central Asia, which would limit the Iranian and Russian influence, also a U.S. goal in 
terms of containing fundamentalism and promoting moderation. Turkmen gas sales might 
promote Turkey as the most viable outlet for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
This would be especially important in order to facilitate the independence and prosperity 
of the Central Asian republics. 
(b) In Iran 
The natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran serves to the U.S. 
interest regarding Iran too. Iran is an important player in calculations related to the 
Central Asian republics, since Iran’s geographic location is important for those states. 
From Iran centric perspective, there are two significant benefits for the U.S. goals in 
Central Asia: first, the tolerant attitude of the U.S. towards the Turkish-Iranian gas 
agreement might help reduce the anti-U.S. sentiments and resentment of Iran towards the 
United States. Iran might assist U.S. goals, since Iranian and American goals overlap on 
seeing the Central Asian states prosperous and independent from the Russian and Chinese 
influence. 
Second, increased interdependence between Turkey and Iran through the 
gas deal is likely to undermine the arbitrary ideological statements of the Mullahs that 
could alienate Turkey and other neighbors in Central Asia. Iran has a strong interest in 
maintaining good relations with Turkey regarding the natural gas agreement and trade 
activities. Therefore, the gas deal can function as an ideological restraint on conservative 
elements in Iran, because Iran has an economic interest in maintaining the transit status 
between Turkey and Central Asia. Iranian conservatives may use the anti-moderate 
rhetoric against the US, but not Turkey, since Iran has a substantial interest in the gas 
pipeline with Turkey.  
                                                 
199 The Turkmen natural gas purchases are planned to start in 2005, and the agreement covers a 
duration of 30 years. 
91 
(c) In Central Asia and the Caspian 
In Central Asia’s Former Soviet Republics, the Turkish-Iranian gas 
agreement serves the U.S. tremendously for four reasons, such as encouraging their 
political and economic independence from Russia, affecting the Iran-Russia de facto 
alliance, increasing Iran’s interest in Central Asia that overlaps with that of the U.S., and 
creating inter-linkages among countries for security and cooperation.  
First, the Turkish-Iranian pipeline helps the political and economic 
independence of the Central Asian republics by offering an alternative route to the 
Russian pipelines. Despite the critiques, which suggest that Iran would benefit from the 
Turkish-Iranian gas pipeline’s transit revenues regarding oil and gas exports from Central 
Asia, the transfer tariffs are not enough to revive the Iran’s economy. However, “the 
benefits to the long-term security of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and the rest of the region 
would be incalculable” according to regional specialist S. Frederick Star.200 
Turkmenistan started gas trade with Iran and will start gas sales to Turkey via Iran in 
2005, which helps its economy. Thus, Turkmenistan will be able to relieve itself from the 
dependence on the Russian pipelines in its exports, and also eventually Kazakhstan. The 
cooperation between Iran and Central Asian Republics in oil and gas sales offers them 
leverage to exploit their natural resources and to maintain the balance among their 
powerful neighbors, such as Russia and China. Therefore, Iranian outlet through Turkish-
Iranian pipeline is essential for the survival of those republics as well as regional 
tranquility. 
Second, the Iranian route, offered by the Turkey-Iran gas pipeline, can 
complicate the de facto Russian-Iranian alliance, because it makes Iran a rival vis-à-vis 
Russia in Central Asia. In that sense, Iran is helping the U.S. objectives in order to 
balance the Russian influence and help the economic independence of the republics in the 
region. If the U.S. fails to achieve economic development in the region, the NIS would be 
bound to cooperate with Russia without Iranian option. It would especially undermine the 
energy development in Central Asia, raise tensions due to Russian influence over 
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resources, and undermine the inter-linkages among Central Asian states to form a 
security body.201 
Third, Iran favors security building and conflict resolution in the region, 
both of which are strategic U.S. interests, and therefore, Iran’s constructive efforts in 
Central Asia makes Iran a “natural” U.S. ally. Iran actively supported the anti-Taliban 
forces in northern Afghanistan and settlement through ‘6+2’ group (the six neighboring 
states – Iran, Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – plus Russia and 
the U.S.). 202 During internal conflicts in Tajikistan in 1996, Iran held peace talks in the 
beginning of 1997 between the Tajik government and opposition groups to establish 
order.203 Iran is one of those countries, which signed a regional cooperation accord to 
fight against narcotics trade from Afghanistan.204 Finally, when Iranian Foreign Minister, 
Kamal Kharrazi, visited Uzbekistan on May 19th, 2004, he stressed that “Iran’s foreign 
policy was based on the establishment of peace and stability in the region, and 
cooperation among regional states, which was acceptable to all.”205 Overall, Iran is 
helping increase the cooperation for security efforts in the region.  
Finally, the Turkish-Iranian gas deal helps create inter-linkages among the 
regional countries. In the same month as the signing of the natural gas agreement 
between Turkey and Iran, Kazakhstan and even Tajikistan, despite their ideological 
differences with Iran, were urged to increase their trade activities in the “re-activated” 
Economic Cooperation Organization, which aims to create a free-trade zone in the 
region.206 Economic linkages among all countries including Iran would not only help 
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economic development of Central Asia, but also increase the need for security for 
neighboring countries. 
8. Policy Recommendations for Turkey 
Even though the natural gas deal with Iran has a lot to offer Turkey politically and 
economically, the main focus of the Turkish Foreign Policy has been good relations with 
the United States and the European Union. A compromise between Turkey and the 
United States is crucial to maintain the strategic interests of both parties with each other. 
Therefore, while increasing the economic and social interaction with Iran, Turkey has to 
keep in mind that the political objectives of increased relations must serve Iran’s, 
Turkey’s and the United States’ interest to maximize the benefits among all. In this sense, 
Turkey’s natural gas agreement with Iran is a unique opportunity to attract Iran to 
openness. If Turkey can create interdependency between Iran and Turkey through 
economic links, such as natural gas cooperation and increased trade, such relations 
between the two countries can serve the interests of others in the region in terms of 
security concerns. 
Iran is important for the U.S. objectives regarding the welfare of the Central 
Asian Republics. Therefore, the interaction with Iran must increase to guarantee the 
success in Central Asia. The Central Asian countries have high expectations from the 
U.S. about receiving a large sum of funds or revenues by creating new opportunities for 
their oil and gas exports. However, Iran is standing in their “immediate” neighborhood 
unlike Turkey and the United States as it is at the nexus of Central Asia and outlet ports 
for the landlocked republics of Central Asia. Consequently, Iran is indispensable for 
securing the success of the Central Asian republics on political, economic and social 
level. Turkey can promote the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement as a significant step 
for Iran’s increased interaction with the West and possibly with the United States, and 
secure the success of the policies in favor of development of the Central Asian republics. 
Turkey should pursue policies in order to create a mechanism for economic 
cooperation among regional countries by using its economic linkage with Iran through 
the natural gas agreement. The natural gas agreement between two countries has the 
potential to “resurrect” the historical Silk Road, which would serve the development of 
the Central Asian countries. The inefficiency of the poor railroads and underdeveloped 
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highways are the major barriers for the trade from Central Asia and Iran to Europe. 
Therefore, the gas deal between Turkey and Iran is a good opportunity to start a large 
scale cooperation to revive the trade among countries in the region.207   
The U.S. hegemony in Central Asia is also indispensable for global control, as 
Brzezinksi stated, regarding the Russian and the Chinese presence in the region.208 
However, it is impossible to limit the Russian and Chinese influence without getting help 
from a regional country. When looking at the region, Russia and China are nearly 
impossible to isolate from the area. For that reason, balancing Russia and China emerges 
as the best alternative strategy to diminish the Russian and Chinese influence on the NIS. 
Iran is the only alternative that could help the U.S. balance Russia and China due to 
Iran’s proximity to Central Asia. If Turkey and Iran can reach a common understanding 
of the issues in Central Asia regarding the promotion of peace, political and economic 
stability, security and cooperation, then Russia is likely to lose its strategic ally, Iran.209 
In order to do that, the natural gas agreement between Iran and Turkey is the best asset to 
establish links between the U.S., Turkey and Iran to benefit from Iran’s geographic 
advantage vis-à-vis Russia and China. 
Turkey is the only country where the interests of other three countries-the U.S., 
Russia and Iran- intersect. Therefore, Turkey is the key to reach a conclusion for security 
building initiatives in the Caspian and Central Asia. Turkey’s natural gas agreement with 
Iran may complicate two de facto U.S.-Turkey and Russia-Iran alliances in the region and 
lead all of them to regional security initiatives, since all have crisscrossing interests on 
each others. Turkey and the U.S. are long term allies, the U.S. does not have diplomatic 
relations with Iran, yet Turkey and Iran have interest to have cooperation with each other. 
Iran turned to Russia in the past due to U.S. diplomatic pressures and economic 
sanctions, but the Turkish-Iranian gas agreement is not in Russia’s interest, since Russia 
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has a large share in Turkey’s natural gas imports. Thus, the agreement affects the 
interests of each country in a different way. Turkey and Russia signed “Eurasia Action 
Plan” in 2001, emphasizing the importance of the Turkish-Russian energy cooperation. 
The plan clearly indicated that the energy issue was the driving force behind the 
cooperation efforts. Therefore, Turkish-Iranian natural gas cooperation can further be 
used the increase inter-linkages between Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States for 
security building in the Caucasus and Central Asia.210   
In order to make the Turkish-Iranian gas pipeline deliver prosperity and stability, 
Turkey should refrain from openly promoting the natural gas agreement with Iran as a 
means to challenge Russia. Russian dominancy over Central Asian Republics still exists 
due to some very important factors; such as pro-Russian leaders and pro-Russian interest 
groups in energy sector. Iran’s acting in Central Asia and the Caspian “responsibly” in 
the past was one of the reasons why Russia continued supplying modern weapons to 
Iran.211 Because Iran and Turkey lack the resources and political leverage to assist those 
republics in the short term, Russia is inevitable to sustain its influence over them. 
Therefore, Turkey must be careful not to pose challenge to Russia to cause its isolation 
through the Turkish-Iranian natural gas agreement. If Turkey –and the U.S. - tries to 
isolate Russia from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, then Russia is much likely to 
use its leverage on the Former Soviet Republics to force them to increase their 
cooperation with Russia. 
Increasing political and economic relations with Iran through the natural gas 
agreement, Turkey should encourage efforts with Iran to solve the disputes about 
Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey and Iran have leverage 
over Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran sided with Armenia and Turkey with Azerbaijan after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the disputes emerged between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Those four countries had crisscrossing visits to each other on state level in 
the past. Armenia had relatively better relations with Iran than Turkey, whereas 
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Azerbaijan had warm relations with Turkey vis-à-vis Iran. Therefore, the natural gas 
agreement between Turkey and Iran has the potential to persuade Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to solve the disputes through peaceful means and increase the stability and 
avoid armed conflicts, which is also one of the U.S. objectives in Central Asia and the 
Caspian.212 
Finally, consolidating the access of the Former Soviet Union Republics to the 
Euro-Atlantic security cooperation schemes might be useful in persuading Iran and 
Russia to participate in a new security initiative. Iran and Russia are less likely to stay 
outside of a large scale attempt, since both try to increase their influence in Central Asia. 
Turkey can play the major role in persuading Iran to have increased relations with the 
U.S. in such an initiative due to increased interdependency resulted from the Turkish-
Iranian gas agreement.213 
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Turkey and Iran are two countries with historical rivalries in their past. This 
competitive character in their relations continued throughout their history until today 
despite the similarities in their political and economic structures. Despite the fact that 
both countries had similar desires for economic development and western prosperity, they 
did not keep their economic and political relations on a high level with each other during 
the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Following his rule in 1979, with the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, economic relations between Turkey and Iran increased dramatically 
due to Iran-Iraq War even with the ideological differences between the two countries. 
Despite some negative developments throughout the 1980s, the economic relations 
continued on a relatively high level while keeping the political relations on average. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union collapsed and a “new era” of 
post-Cold War started with new prospects in the region. Having substantial proximity and 
holding key locations, Turkey and Iran quickly tried to increase their influence within the 
New Independent States in Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, becoming a leading 
power for those countries quickly proved to be hard, and Turkey and Iran realized that 
they lacked enough economic means and capacities to help the Turkic Republics in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
In the early 1990s, Turkey’s energy need started to increase due primarily to 
industrial reasons forcing Turkey to look for additional options. Turkey was importing 
natural gas from Russia through pipelines via Bulgaria in the northwest and the Blue 
Stream pipeline under the Black Sea in the northeast. In addition, Turkey was also 
importing liquefied gas from Algeria and Nigeria.  Additionally, Turkish energy policy 
dictated a need to play an active role in pipeline politics encouraging the oil and gas 
transfers from the Middle East and the Caspian to Europe through Turkish territory. As 
the energy need of Europe increased, the need for energy security gained importance, 
since Russia was the only outside supplier to Europe delivering natural gas through 
pipelines. Thus, Europe had the potential to import additional natural gas and Turkey was 
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in the middle of Europe and the natural gas rich areas. Therefore, it did not take long for 
Turkey to seek a partnership with Iran due to its vast natural gas reserves. 
Turkey and Iran signed the agreement guaranteeing natural gas sales to Turkey in 
mid-1996, and the gas sales started in 2001 upon construction of the gas pipelines from 
Iran to Turkey. Turkey benefited from the natural gas agreement in different areas: 
politically, economically and environmentally. Through the gas agreement, Turkey 
increased its relations with Iran. The two countries agreed on having more trade activities 
as well as gas sales. The trade activities continued to increase at a steady pace annually. 
In addition, Turkey and Iran worked together in their security issues such as establishing 
joint security committees and launching simultaneous border operations against the PKK. 
Thus, a larger cooperation flourished between the two bordering countries as a result of 
their natural gas cooperation. 
Turkey not only received a positive response from Iran regarding the PKK, but 
also Iran did not use its Islamic rhetoric against Turkey, which can be considered as a 
contribution to Turkey’s national security regarding the Islamist elements in Turkey. 
Turkey always perceived the Islamic rhetoric of Iranian mullahs’ as a threat due to the 
Islamic groups in Turkey. However, the Iranian economic interest proved to be more 
crucial than the ideological principles of the mullahs. Therefore, the natural gas 
agreement also benefited Turkey in national security terms. 
Turkey’s gas agreement with Iran also benefited Turkey on the EU front. After 
raising the prospects of supplying Europe with Iranian natural gas, rapprochement 
between Turkey and Greece came to the table between both countries due to the need for 
cooperation in natural gas transportation from Iran to Europe. Thus, the cooperation 
started after the signing of the natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran, and 
turned into interdependency between three linking countries, Iran, Turkey and Greece. In 
addition, Turkey was able to promote its geographic significance in Europe’s energy 
security. The natural gas pipelines between Turkey and Iran proved that Europe’s energy 
diversification regarding oil and gas lay in Turkey. Since Turkey is the shortest link 
between Europe and the Middle East, the natural gas agreement with Iran can even play a 
role in Turkey’s EU membership process. 
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Turkey’s natural gas agreement with Iran also affected the plans of Russia and the 
United States in the region. One the one hand, Turkey was able to diversify its natural gas 
imports through Iran, so Russia would not be the only natural gas supplier via pipeline to 
Turkey anymore. Turkey also signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to purchase gas 
through Iranian territory undermining the Russian monopoly in oil and gas exports to the 
Central Asian republics. Russia was the absolute monopoly in controlling the Central 
Asian oil and gas exports. Russia still has leverage over NIS, however the Turkish-
Iranian natural gas pipeline created new opportunities for the Central Asian republics to 
get their oil and gas exports through Iranian and Turkish territory, and this has made 
Russian influence more difficult than before. 
The implementation of the natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran may 
result in consequences that might bother Turkey’s interest in other areas. Russia is the 
biggest concern regarding the negative aspect of such consequences. Ending Russia’s 
monopoly in pipeline politics from Central Asia to the West is the primary reason that 
would urge Russia to exert pressure in order to reestablish its influence over the Former 
Soviet Republics. Since those republics are still largely vulnerable to Russia through 
economic and political policies, the development of the political and economic 
institutions in Central Asia might take longer. In addition, the BTC pipeline has a 
“politically fragile” route through Georgia. In order to bother the Turkish interest, Russia 
might use South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a trump card against Georgia to undermine the 
security of the BTC pipeline. 
On the other hand, the natural gas agreement between Turkey and Iran meant a 
two sided issue to the United States. The U.S. opposed the agreement on the basis that the 
agreement would provide revenues to the Iranian economy and work against the U.S. 
sanctions towards Iran. However, the agreement was helpful to the revival of the Central 
Asia’s New Independent States, the major U.S. goal in Central Asia. Through the natural 
gas agreement between Turkey and Iran, Iran established a natural gas pipeline from Iran 
to Turkey and linked the same pipeline to Turkmenistan. Thus, the pipeline that the U.S. 
opposed in principle turned into an asset that assists the U.S. goals in Central Asia in 
strengthening those states economically and encouraging their economic and political 
independence from Russia.  
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Despite the fact that the United States opposed Turkey’s Iranian natural gas 
agreement, it had an interest strengthening Turkey as a Muslim democracy, which was 
another aspect of the U.S. interest regarding Central Asia and the Caspian. The United 
States needs a successful model of Muslim democracy in order to promote the 
development of social, economic and political institutions in Central Asia’s young 
republics. Regarding their potential in population growth in the future, they are expected 
to be a decisive number for regional stability and security issues. Therefore, it is very 
important for the U.S. and global security to succeed the political and social 
developments, both of which go through Turkey’s wellbeing and natural gas pipeline 
with Iran. 
The Turkish-Iranian gas agreement not only serves the U.S. interest in Eurasia, 
but also helps Iran’s openness. Based on a higher concern for its economic interests, 
Iran’s focus is not on spreading its Islamic influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
Also, Turkey and the Former Soviet Union Republics are not receptive to the Islamic 
principles in their daily lives. Therefore, Iran continuously refrains from imposing 
Islamic principles to prevent those republics from being alienated, which helps reduce 
Iran’s fundamentalist approach. 
When looking overall, Turkey emerges as the intersection spot for the interests of 
many actors inside and outside of the region. One single natural gas pipeline connects 
Central Asia to Europe and can benefit many countries on the route distributing 
prosperity and stability. The interest of the U.S., the EU, Greece, Iran and the Former 
Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the Caspian converge in Turkey leaving many 
differences aside in order to receive the economic benefits. Therefore, Turkey has the 
potential to create and promote the interdependency among many different countries for 
future possibilities of security building issues using its natural gas pipeline with Iran. 
Despite the fact that many actors in the region have different points of view towards the 
issues, all of them eventually can agree that security, cooperation and stability is going to 
benefit them more in the future rather than instability and uneasiness. The Turkish-
Iranian gas agreement is a good opportunity to promote good relations between Iran and 
the West, and including Russia’s interest through Turkish territory is also possible while 
reducing the monopoly over its near abroad.  
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Regarding the future prospects, the need for natural gas will continue to increase, 
stimulate the disputes over its use and its transport will continue to be an ongoing issue 
among the haves and have nots. In solving the disputes in order to prevent the instability 
in Central Asia and Caucasus, all scenarios eventually need the participation of Turkey 
and Iran, since they hold the key positions for pipeline crossing in the region. Pipelines 
will be as important in the 21st Century’s “New Great Game” as the railroads were of 
great significance in the “old” one. The purpose of delivering prosperity, transfer goods 
and having control of that mechanism were great importance in the past, and is likely to 
be important in the future. Passages still are quite important to keep the control of 
resources and acquire advantages over others. Despite the fact that many battles were 
fought to gain the control in the past, 21st Century is the century of negotiations, and 
compromise due to unlikelihood of an armed conflict, since it will be too costly for 
everybody. Therefore, the more countries are connected by the pipelines, the less fight is 
likely to emerge while each actor is likely to receive more benefit than expected. In 
achieving that, Turkey is still the key, and will maintain its status in the future due to 
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